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ABSTRACT
Nathanael West‟s tragically brief creative career was intensely concerned with the
anomie of modern society, especially in the landscape of twentieth-century America. For West,
this landscape is one populated by the disintegration of traditional community and the
interrogation of values once posited as unassailable. As such, conventional West criticism has
read the author as an intractable nihilist. Within the last decade, however, West criticism has
taken an entirely new approach. Critics like Jonathan Greenberg and Justus Nieland have
attempted to erect an ethical West by placing him within the discourse of modernist
antisentimentalism. It is within this critical reevaluation of West that I would like to place my
argument. When we are first introduced to the title character of West‟s Miss Lonelyhearts, we
find the advice columnist incapable of offering another hackneyed response to his suffering
readership, which is a refusal that places him on the road to what we might call a sincere ethical
response that seeks an appropriate message of hope and healing. As we see, though, Miss
Lonelyhearts‟ ethical journey is fraught with peril: he must constantly battle with the rhetoric of
the newspaper column‟s sentimentalism, a morally bankrupt culture that degrades his desire for
sincerity, and the dangers of egotistical pride. Indeed, he presumably dies unable to realize his
ethical responsibility. Nonetheless, I locate within this ostensibly meaningless death and within
the text the potential of a radical reassessment of ethics that anticipates the work of Emmanuel
Levinas. For Levinas, ethical traumatism commands a supererogatory giving out of the subject,
who has no available means of what constitutes an appropriate moral response. Using the ethical
philosophy of Levinas, I perform a close reading of the novel that finds a West who presents
ethical responsibility as a trauma that obligates the subject to a moral duty it can neither fulfill
nor defer. We see, then, that the ethical moment in West comes not in normative ethical action,
but instead, comes in the traumatic moments of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ “writer‟s block,” when
language and cognition break down, and Miss Lonelyhearts has absolutely no idea how to
respond or proceed.
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Soldiers! Don‟t give yourselves to these brutes – who despise you – enslave you – who
regiment your lives – tell you what to do – what to think and what to feel! Who drill you – diet
you – treat you like cattle and use you as cannon fodder. Don‟t give yourselves to these
unnatural men – machine men with machine minds and machine hearts! You are not machines!
You are men!
– Charlie Chaplin
The Great Dictator
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I. INTRODUCTION
In William March‟s Company K (1933) – a novel composed as a series of vignettes, each
depicting the perspective of an individual American soldier or officer as he tries to make sense
out of events either before World War I or upon the battlefield – there is a particularly revealing
sketch that gives insight into what Western societies had introduced to them there on the shellscorched fields of France.1 As Private Charles Gordon stands looking at the group of captured
enemy soldiers he and his company have marched to an isolated ravine, he makes eye contact
with one of the men – a German with blue eyes. The blue-eyed man looks at Gordon and smiles;
Gordon involuntarily smiles right back in what seems an essentially natural reaction of
fellowship. And as the company sergeant gives the firing commands, and as Gordon takes
“steady aim at the blue-eyed man,” whatever sense of fellowship these two soldiers may have
felt immediately reveals itself as false and illusory. “For some reason,” states Gordon, “I wanted
him to be killed instantly.” Perhaps the young private feels compassion towards this German,
this stranger, and as such, desires that he die a quick and relatively painless death. But as
Gordon continues to stand and fire upon the man, watching him writhe in agony and listening to
his horrible moans that seem to be taunting Gordon‟s compassion and thwarting his effort at
mercy, the real irony of this war is shown to the American doughboy: “ „Everything I was ever
taught to believe about mercy, justice and virtue is a lie,‟…. „But the biggest lie of all are the
words “God is Love.” That is really the most terrible lie that man ever thought of‟ ” (86). How
much pain, Gordon asks, can a loving God allow human individuals to endure?

1

William March had himself served as a soldier during the American war effort in WWI, and many of the tales in
Company K are based on his own experiences.
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For Europe and America, World War I marked the sense of a great historical loss, not just
in the unprecedented amounts of young men wasted upon the field of battle, but in the cultural
values composing a mythos that had sustained the Western imagination and sense of identity for
centuries. Indeed, the prewar period was one that still relatively retained the continuity of a
Western ethos predicated upon cultural ideals that were essentially viewed as real and palpable
rather than as the abstractions that various circles within the Western intelligentsia claimed them
to be. As Paul Fussell claims in The Great War and Modern Memory, “[T]he Great War took
place in what was, compared with ours, a static world, where the values appeared stable and
where the meanings of abstractions seemed permanent and reliable. Everyone knew what Glory
was, and what Honor meant” (21). For Fussell, as it is for March, the experience of the war is
indelibly the experience of modern irony par excellence: “Out of the world of summer, 1914,
marched a unique generation. It believed in Progress and Art and in no way doubted the
benignity even of technology. The word machine was not yet invariably coupled with the word
gun” (24). According to Fussell, WWI was to be the last war that took place within a world
seemingly guided by a purposeful history that did not lack, as of yet, a narrative coherence (21).
This coherence negotiated a rational human telos and historical destiny, while it also guaranteed
the legitimation and meaning of warfare and human suffering as necessities toward the ultimate
fulfillment of the rational, utopian end. WWI, then, was the beginning of an alternative
historical narrative marked not by progress and rational necessity (such as in Hegelian
dialecticism) but by absence – that is, modern history began to be looked at by several thinkers
and artists as completely devoid of the presence of value and destiny.
It was not until 1945, however, when this questioning of both Enlightenment ideals and
of a world grounded in a faith in deity, would come to a head. In that year, modernity and
2

rationalism asserted themselves in horrific ways previously unimagined, of which the Great War
was just a glimpse. The Holocaust marks the ultimate (and untimely) point of modernity‟s full
self-reflexivity – the event that guaranteed and solidified the completion of the epoch‟s cominginto-awareness. The mass murder of six million Jewish men, women, and children can be
viewed as the event that finally answered the questions posed by places like Marne, Verdun, and
the Somme, and that answer was found in what several thinkers viewed as the absolute loss of
intrinsic value and meaning in human history.2 Post-Holocaust Jewish philosopher, Emil L.
Fackenheim, states that the Holocaust is “an event that called into question all things – God,
man, the ancient revelation and the modern secular self-confidence, philosophic thought and
indeed any kind of thought” (9). For Fackenheim, the Holocaust is the West‟s final reckoning
with Enlightenment. Kant, that inimitable proponent of reason and hope,3 possesses a faith in
humankind; he maintains the existence of a good will present in every human being even if often
overshadowed by moral degradation. This “Idea of Humanity,” as Fackenheim describes it,
experiences a crisis at the hands of the Nazi Aryan ideal:
Kant, in short, believes in humanity: but is that belief warranted? Perhaps it was
so in Kant‟s time. Arguably it was once warranted at any time if only because,
while undemonstrable, this belief was at least also irrefutable…. It is true that
Kant‟s belief in humanity could at not time be verified. However, not until the
advent of the Holocaust world was this belief refuted, for here the reality that is
2

An entire generation of post-Holocaust Jewish thinkers has attempted to come to terms with what this event means
to both the Jewish people and to modernity. For Richard Rubenstein, the traditional notion of God is no longer
possible after an experience like Auschwitz. For Eliezer Berkovits, the Holocaust represents the ultimate demise of
Western, specifically Christian, religious and moral culture (Haas 219-21).
3
Already, in Kant, is the awareness of the possibility of historical absence; however, Kant professes that the
individual must retain hope in the meaning of his or her existence. This alone, for Kant, makes life inherently
meaningful and purposeful. We must hope because we don‟t know, and in this hoping, life becomes valuable.
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object of the belief was itself systematically annihilated. That this was possible is
the awful legacy of Auschwitz to all humanity. The awful legacy for philosophy
is that the annihilation of human personality robs the Idea of Humanity of its
indispensable basis. (273)
The Holocaust scoffs at Kant‟s ideal of a virtuous human community and a cosmopolitan ethics.
That seemingly “good” human beings could participate in such horrific acts of violence toward
others, with apparently good conscience – believing this violence a service to the State, or to das
Volk, or, most bizarrely, even to humanity – seems to rob such notions as History, Freedom, and
the Human of their value and worth. “Auschwitz,” states Fackenheim, “does not paralyze this or
that philosophical thought but the whole metaphysical capacity” (276). The Holocaust
challenges – indeed, “paralyzes” – the metaphysics of Humanity. God and the Human are called
into question, and along with them, the traditional systems of ethical thought and moral action.
For certain individuals and intellectual circles, this means that no longer is there confidence in a
morality of deity or a morality predicated upon the “unassailable” soundness of human reason.
Framed by the horrific memory of the Great War and the looming specter of the Second
World War, the interwar period is characterized by an ethical despondency that shaped not only
philosophy but also the creative work of an entire generation of authors. The modernist writers
of the Lost Generation demonstrate, within their works, disillusionment with conventional
cultural values and the traditional social structure. As such, one of the central dilemmas that
defines modernism is the precarious attempt to resurrect an ethical meaning and moral
sustenance for the contemporary West. Fully cognizant of this dilemma, Nathanael West‟s Miss
Lonelyhearts, then, traces a coming-into-awareness of modernity, articulating the twentiethcentury‟s crisis of ethics, both in reaction to the Great War and in anticipation of the Nazi death
4

camps. What West‟s fictional work depicts is a modernity in turmoil as all versions of ameliorist
history collapse into disrepair and all versions of conventional ethics – whether originating in
God or in Reason – irrevocably fall prey to the censure of modern skepticism. Lacking the sense
that neither the suffering of his correspondents is justifiable nor human life meaningful, Miss
Lonelyhearts searches for a moral solution adequate to the task of redeeming human suffering –
a response that will place this suffering within a historical narrative of sense and value. Against
a twentieth-century that increasingly problematizes deity, Miss Lonelyhearts attempts to cling to
a mythic imagination, as suggested by his Christian ideal, assuming the role of Christ in his quest
to alleviate the pain of others and bestow purpose upon individual lives. But this attempt at a
Christian moral response, professing value in such things as love, fellowship, and self-sacrifice,
reveals itself as intransigently troubled and horribly inept in the novel; Miss Lonelyhearts‟ world
is one that seems to refuse any attempts at purpose and to preclude any attempts at legitimating
the suffering of individuals. This suffering world reveals itself as stubbornly nonsensical, thus
claiming to parallel our own. In this sense, Miss Lonelyhearts is to be read as an interrogation of
the value of ethical response in a modern era where moral language no longer seems to make any
sense, where the belief of historical agency seems a punching-dummy and communal sharing
nothing but mere nostalgia.
Indeed, Miss Lonelyhearts presents us with such an inexorable challenge to the
possibility of restoring ethical meaning that conventional West criticism has cited the author as
obdurately unwilling to proclaim a viable approach to modernism‟s moral dilemma. For Mike
Frank in “The Passion of Miss Lonelyhearts According to Nathanael West,” the novel‟s
dominant theme is none other than futility itself as well as the “rage that must follow from that
futility if one begins by assuming that solutions are not only necessary but possible” (70). As
5

Frank claims, the Christian myth, projected forth in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-complex,4 no
longer possesses any viability for modernity; rather, the only myth that applies to the
contemporary world is the myth of the wasteland:
Instead, West implies, the applicable myth is that of the wasteland, and, in fact,
the wasteland myth made even more hopeless, for in West‟s version the death of
the scapegoat presages no redemption whatsoever. West sees the world as a
perennial wasteland in which heroism is meaningless and martyrdom futile. The
only way to go on in such a world is to be blind to the true nature of things and to
persist in a delusory faith. Thus Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents are in a real
sense better off than he is, for they, at least, can believe in him. (73)
Such a reading, then, suggests that West negates the prospect of recovering either a sense of
existential value or even a hint of ethical meaning. The world, as defined by West, simply is,
and it exists as such without substance and coherence. Frank continues by claiming that “the
only reasonable alternative to the protagonist‟s furious despair,” to a world that resists value, “is
cynicism, and Shrike‟s responses, repulsive though they may be, at least have the virtue of
making sense, of being adequate to the stimuli” (69). The only other option, Frank posits, is that
of a despair that ends in early death, as in the case of Miss Lonelyhearts (73). Thus, he
concludes, West resists offering any sort of ethical consolation to his contemporaries.
Frank is certainly not alone in his reading of a nihilistic West. In “The Art of Significant
Disorder: The Fiction of Nathanael West,” Jan Gorak places Miss Lonelyhearts within a broader
modernist schema of the artist as “godly maker”; however, rather than playing the part of the
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Frank sees Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-complex as not only a response to the human suffering that he thinks Christ
was to have ended but also as a biting, vitriolic commentary upon “the efficacy of Christ‟s passion” (70).
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hero who is capable of offering a path out of the current social malaise, Miss Lonelyhearts only
constructs a world of illusions, of false realities that offer no legitimate significance to human
life (185-87). Similarly, according to Nancy Walker Hand in “A Novel in the Form of a Comic
Strip: Nathanael West‟s Miss Lonelyhearts,” West exposes the business of dreams – that is, the
desire to restore significance to life – as nothing but dangerous fancy. “[D]reams are dangerous
delusions,” she states, “dangerous because they lead men to believe in solutions to their
problems, in the possibility of order; delusions because order and solutions do not exist, and false
hope makes reality even harsher by contrast” (15).5 Furthermore, in Nathanael West: An
Interpretative Study, James F. Light thinks that we are to perceive Miss Lonelyhearts‟ death as
ultimately meaningless (100). Miss Lonelyhearts, enraptured by the prospect of being able to
perform a miracle in order to demonstrate his faith, misreads Peter Doyle‟s scream, believing it
to be the pleas for help of all his correspondents. Rather than pleading for help, though, Doyle
presumably shoots and kills Miss Lonelyhearts instead. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ untimely demise,
then, would seem to negate, according to Light, any sort of redemptive power – he simply dies,
and that is that.6

5

Hand notes that the theme of disorder is even evident in the novel‟s stylistic structure:
The abrupt changes of scene, the introduction of characters at seemingly random points, and the
patterns of anticlimactic events and ironies create an impression of disorder, of chaos and
unpredictability, which reflects West‟s view of man‟s life. (14)
6
In his study, Light also discusses the youthful West, as a student at Brown University during the 1920s. As Light
uses these revelations of the younger West, we are meant to see the roots of the author‟s potentially (un)ethical
stance. “As a youth who had read Nietzsche and Flaubert, Dostoevsky and Baudelaire,” Light states, “he was aware
of his difference from ordinary humankind, and he was susceptible to certain ideas about the superman, above
ordinary codes and laws” (31). More significantly, Light recasts John Sanford‟s (a friend of West‟s during the
writer‟s Brown days) account of West‟s apparent enthusiastic support for Baudelaire‟s trenchant retort to a poor
beggar, who had accosted the Frenchman for money. “Apparently West approved the action of Baudelaire,” Light
claims, “and for Sanford the approval indicated West‟s lack of love for the weak and helpless, his receptivity to
Nietzschean ideas” (31). Further, Light continues by writing that “[t]hese superman concepts he would have to
struggle with and conquer before he was fully human, but in college the ideas were attractive” (31).
While both Light and Sanford may be correct in their interpretation of West‟s actions here in response to
Baudelaire, they fail to take into account the significance of Baudelaire‟s rejection. His rejection of the beggar was
not necessarily a rejection of ethical responsibility (though one certainly could read it this way), but more
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While it is admittedly easy to read the death of Miss Lonelyhearts as meaningless and
insignificant, this death betrays, nonetheless, an awareness of the confusion entailed by ethics.
Miss Lonelyhearts is one confused man, and his death is no less confusing. In its morbid
relationship to his failed ethical responsibility, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ death scene signals a
conceptualization of ethics that is supererogatory and beyond apprehension. Miss Lonelyhearts
remains unable to ever fulfill his ethical duty and obligation unto the other. That he is killed by
the one whom he wishes to help indicates that, for West, we can never be assured of either our
ethical capacities or of our fulfillment of ethical responsibility. Rather than being insignificant,
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ death gestures at the real demands of ethics, which is a traumatizing
experience that takes the subject out of any sense of familiarity and moral coherence. Although
the death of Miss Lonelyhearts, as well as the novel itself, is a confrontation with nihilism, we
are not necessarily meant to read it or West as nihilistic. In this sense, I would like to suggest
that in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ confrontation with despair, we find in its apparently bleak conclusions
the foundations of an authentic ethics that doesn‟t correspond with the conventional morality that
West criticizes. Positing ethical experience as trauma and morality as not just duty but also a
foundation of being,West becomes vastly relevant to current philosophical thought, sharing
ethical values with those of Emmanuel Levinas.
In the preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas states, “Everyone will readily agree that it
is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality” (21). Like West,
Levinas asks if we are only deceiving ourselves when we speak of such things as ethics and
moral action, and also like West, Levinas writes during a century of unimagined atrocity and
importantly, was a rejection of bourgeois morality, particularly bourgeois sentimentality. I will have much more to
say about West‟s relationship with the discourse of ethical sentimentalism, especially the popular versions of mass
culture sentimentalism, below.
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violence. For Levinas, the question of ethics is one that must be approached through a
recognition of the tendency of traditional systems of moral thought to generalize and abstract the
site of ethical interaction. Conventional ethics are, for the French philosopher, marked by
sameness, relationality, and dependence – all of which consume both the autonomy and the
integrity of the other into the same (i.e., generalize the other‟s particularity). As Levinas claims,
the other stands apart from any idea or concept that the self may have for approaching him or
her. Rather, the particularity of the other expresses beyond form, beyond intelligence – the other
is the absolute particular. For this reason, any ethical scheme that generalizes the other is, in
Levinas, a violence committed against him or her. The particularity of the other is what gives us
the human and gives us the ethical relationship. Positing an ethics of difference, Levinas argues
for the radical particularity of the self and of the other, neither of which maintains an ethical
relation with another that can be generalized through language and thought. The other is a
stranger, completely separate in its existence, and not – as a conventional ethics of reason would
have it, according to Levinas – an extension of the self. Because the other maintains the integrity
of its existence, the other also calls into question the self‟s freedom,7 commanding the self to act
in response to its suffering, but more specifically, in response to its position as master. The face
of the other, as master, commands ethical response out of the self, but at the same time, requires
the recognition of the face‟s otherness – that is, requires the particularity of response instead of a
universalist agenda. In response to the other, Levinas claims, the self must not resort to an ethics
of sameness but, rather, must embrace an ethics of difference that respects the alterity of the

7

Levinas‟s philosophy is admittedly fraught with ambiguity and seeming inconsistency. The issues of agency and
necessity do not typically concern Levinas; rather, freedom – in the sense of the subject‟s separation – and its
interrogation by the other take precedence in Levinasian thought. The self, according to Levinas, is both separate
from and obligated to the other. While the self maintains its autonomy, it is also, ironically, called into question by
the other. Thus, for Levinas, not only is ethics a site of difference but subjectivity itself is also viewed as difference.
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other. Real ethical interaction does not begin until the self comes to a recognition of its
responsibility and obligation toward the other, both of which impose unbearable, supererogatory
demands. This responsibility and obligation toward the other – this justice, as Levinas deems it –
make claims upon the self that go far beyond what the self is actually capable of delivering, and
in this sense, ethics becomes a site of continuous trauma.8
As I argue in this paper, both West and Levinas are to be read as attempting to negotiate
an ethics appropriate to modernity, an ethics located outside of traditional systems of
philosophical thought and non-reducible to sameness. West‟s fiction has most often been
received by critics as a nihilistic disavowal of moral action and value. These critics have tended
to view Miss Lonelyhearts, specifically, as West‟s gesture at the essential demise of any sort of
authentic ethical response after modernity (if indeed, there were ever an authenticity in ethics at
all). Reading Miss Lonelyhearts, however, in the light of Levinasian ethical philosophy, reveals
what I claim to be a vastly different West, as both artist and thinker, from what critics have
imagined. In West, as I will argue, ethics is still a possibility but one which must be radically
reconfigured and persistently interrogated. West‟s ethical response, then, like Levinas‟s, can be
characterized as an experience of trauma that makes continuous and unbearable claims upon the

8

Levinas posits subjectivity as a pre-ontological traumatism. The other is always already present in the self‟s
existence, making claims upon the self even before the self is able to respond in any sort of capacity at all. (For
more about the pre-ontological, see pages 41-44.) As such, ethical interaction becomes the experience of this
primordial trauma. The face of the other always commands a response from the self that is above and beyond what
the self is ever actually capable of delivering.
Interestingly, in Vigilant Memory: Emmanuel Levinas, the Holocaust, and the Unjust Death, R. Clifton
Spargo traces what can be characterized as Levinas‟s language of traumatism to the Jewish philosopher‟s continued
reckoning with the Holocaust. Spargo argues that Levinas employs a “strategy of referring to the Holocaust by
rhetorical indirection, through figures of rupture and unpleasure” (24). Levinas‟s unwillingness to directly speak
about the Holocaust in his works is a product of both his nonhistoricist method and “his respect for the victims who
have been silenced and should not be presumptively ventriloquized” (24). Spargo continues by claiming that, in
Levinas, “[t]o the extent that the Holocaust is invoked as a superfluous sign of injustice, it characterizes the
precariousness of ethics within philosophy as though ethics must run parallel hereafter to the political questions
raised by post-1945 memory” (24).
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self. For West, the self is constantly called into question by the other who commands the self to
ethical response. As I argue here, West posits a new ethics of difference and traumatism that not
only anticipates the thought of Levinas but also anticipates the shift in late twentieth-century
ethical and political theory from the primacy of the self to the primacy of the other.9

9

Levinas is not alone among mid- to late twentieth-century thinkers shifting their philosophies towards the
centrality of the other rather than the self. Lacan‟s psychoanalytic ethics posits the other‟s primacy in the ego, while
the tradition of Deconstructive ethics, beginning in Derrida, also places primacy upon the other.
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II. MODERNITY AND THE QUESTION OF COMMUNITY
Modernity, quite simply, is an age of irony. On the one hand, it is a history that traces
humankind‟s fervent emphasis upon the individual, society, reason, and progress (not to mention
another modernity that also finds value in deity and religious faith). Enlightenment humanism
professed a profound faith in the subject‟s agency, and its political theory generally endorsed
democratic social institutions, while the foundation of Enlightenment thought was a belief in the
possibility of truth and knowing. However, on the other hand, the Enlightenment is haunted by a
history that follows humanity‟s increasing doubt and skepticism over knowledge and certainty;
this was the modernity marked by Nietzsche‟s “death of God,” the alienation of the individual,
and the collapse of traditional forms of identification and community. For this discussion, the
latter history becomes particularly crucial in examining the sociophilosophical milieu inherited
by both West and Levinas.10 The enervation of traditional forms of communal identification in
modernity, with its weakening of the social structures that allow for consensus, creates a site in
which numerous individuals find themselves both disenfranchised from a social whole and
lacking in a coherent belief structure. Aware of the troubled relationship between community
and individual that modernity entails, West and Levinas seek approaches to ethics that do not
necessarily depend upon the unification of a social structure.
In this chapter, I will explore the dialectic between community and individual as it exists
according to modern skepticism and nihilism. Closely examining Nietzsche‟s understanding of
modernity, I hope to demonstrate how, for the German philosopher, the mythic capacity of the

10

I should go ahead and acknowledge here that West and Levinas do not share similar ideas concerning religion.
While West was a non-practicing Jew, Levinas still placed much stock in his Judaism. In fact, Levinas‟s theology
plays a significant role in informing his ethical philosophy. It is important to realize, however, that both authors are
keenly aware that they inherit a modernity that questions the possibility of grounding ethical action and thought in
such values as deity and reason, and, as such, they both search for viable alternatives.
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communal structure no longer holds absolute power in determining individuals‟ social
identifications and values. This conversation, as I will later claim, is essential for understanding
why West and Levinas reject the attempt, on the part of some, to resurrect traditional community
in an effort to restore its “mythic” value.
As I imply above, “modernity” is a vastly relative term; however, the modernity that currently
concerns us the most is that which questions the coherence of both Enlightenment values and
systems of religious belief. This metaphysico-epistemological doubt finds some of its most
substantial advocacy in the thought of Nietzsche, where the entirety of the Western metaphysical
tradition is thrown into the flames of inquisition. Truth, according to Nietzsche, is an
anthropomorphism – that is, truth is “made” by human beings rather than an Absolute existing
apart from human actions. In an early essay, entitled “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,”
Nietzsche posits truth and knowing not as present, stable matters available to human beings for
access, but, instead, as radically contingent and mere linguistic play. “What then is truth?” he
asks, “A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of
human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and
embellished” (112). Thus, for Nietzsche, truth and knowing are by necessity themselves
illusory: “Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions” (112). This attack upon
metaphysics and logos launches an assault against what Derrida has characterized as the
metaphysics of presence. What begins with Nietzsche, then, is a tradition of modern thought that
posits both truth and history as absence and lack rather than presence and destiny; with Nietzsche
is the advent of an intense philosophical skepticism that holds the Archimedean point of Western
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metaphysics under harsh scrutiny. And this “point,” this presence, is to be traced, according to
Nietzsche, to the very mythological capacity of human beings and culture.
The mythologizing force in human intellect is what, for Nietzsche, serves as the
provenance of culture and truth. Mythos serves as a way of binding together people into a
community of shared belief and value. According to David Owen in Maturity and Modernity:
Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason, the mythological capacity, in
Nietzsche‟s formulation, serves two predominant uses. “Firstly,” Owen states, “it functions as a
system of explanation which legitimates the customs constitutive of a culture…. Secondly, myth
in its festive embodiment provides a channel through which the communal re-affirmation of a
culture is articulated” (43-44). One might say, then, that the ability to narrate is also the ability
to “narrate,” or form, a culture; myth becomes the route by which a community is capable of
constructing itself, its values, its beliefs, and its truths. As long as the desire for this
mythological force is present in human culture, then, according to Nietzsche, individuals are
viewed as an intrinsic part of their communities, and the value of each individual – that is, their
social significance as well as their belief in their own personal significance – is determined and
upheld by the communal whole.
Modernity, however, marks the questioning of the mythological capacity of culture,
thereby disrupting both historical continuity and the processes of communal identification. The
outcome of this enervation of mythic value is found in what Nietzsche describes as modern
nihilism – the disavowal of truth and value after the “death of God.”11 For Nietzsche, modern
secularist culture has brought about the “death of God,” meaning that, in this formulation, no
11

Nietzsche‟s thought held currency, primarily, for some individuals in the artistic avant-garde and the intelligentsia
at different times throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most people, however, were
obviously not Nietzscheans, nor did they share analagous sensibilities or ideas concerning tradition, community, and
value.
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longer are Western cultures and individuals able to legitimate belief and value through an appeal
to deity (as they had in what Nietzsche essentially constructs as the Christian past); similarly,
Nietzsche thinks we now no longer have an appeal to divinity (not that we ever did, he claims) in
order to make sense out of existence and individual lives. Modern nihilism posits that no value
is present in life, and therefore, life and the actions of human agents are (ultimately)
meaningless. According to Owen, “Nihilism emerges in that moment in which the will to truth
abolishes the ground of its own value and becomes conscious of itself as a problem” (59). The
will to truth, for Nietzsche, incites the mythic imagination, and thus, once this will abolishes
itself, myth also loses its substance, thereby negating both the community and the individual as
transcendental values. While Nietzsche praises what he understands as modernity‟s loss of value
in a Christian mythos, he, nonetheless, acknowledges the need for myth in individual lives and
cultures so as to avoid the negating, nihilistic tendency of modernity. “Within prehistory,”
argues Owen, “the individual‟s goals were determined by the customs constitutive of the
community. The moment of history, however, signals the overcoming of the morality of
custom,” indicating the necessity of “an alternative source of goals” as well as implying “the
possibility of the individuals determining their own goals” (40).
In other words, the loss of communal value within modernity necessitates, for Nietzsche,
that human subjects be capable of creating their own myths, their own values to live by, and the
challenge presented by this impasse is truly exciting for him. But, regardless of the mythic
potential of the individual agents who have cast aside tradition in modernity, with the weakening
of mythic value in culture, modernity marks the disruption of traditional forms of identification
and meaning-making; this loss also casts ethical systems as suspect and questionable. In this
sense, the “death of God” means not only the demise of the transcendental value of Christian
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ethics but also the loss of authority in ethics determined through appeal to culture and to reason.
As Nietzsche suggests about the “linguistics” of truth, we might similarly look at ethics as a
matter of wordplay and nothing more.
The prospect that community and culture may no longer possess the “narrative” coherence they
once possessed is extremely troubling to many individuals, and with good reason. If indeed
traditional forms of communal identification cease to determine social roles and values, then,
according to these individuals, all of our systems of ethical thought and action become negated.
Realizing the devastating potential of such a social enervation, various attempts were launched at
recovering and reconstructing the bonds of traditional society within modernity. One such
project is that of sentimentalism. Sentimentalism‟s agenda seeks to heal the wounds of a
fractured world by proclaiming communal solidarity and ethical capacity matters of the
cultivation of affect. By cultivating sympathy and affective relationships, sentimentalism posits
the possibility of unifying a vastly disparate and fragmented social sphere. In the following
chapter, I will argue for a conceptualization of sentimentalism as an attempt to revivify
traditional community, placing this attempt in direct opposition to West‟s modernist stance.
Indeed, we should read Miss Lonelyhearts as a significant confrontation of modernist
antisentimentalism – as professed by West – with the project of mass sentimentalism. While we
have various options for approaching a fragmented social sphere, sentimentalism being one such
approach, West and Levinas, however, imagine a radical form of repair.
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III. WEST, MODERNISM, AND THE INTERROGATION OF ETHICS
The break in historical continuity among traditional societies in modernity creates the need for
restructuring the social through a reinvigorated mythos of public kinship and solidarity. The
Enlightenment sought to fulfill this need through two different approaches. One, the familiar
Enlightenment emphasis upon reason, approached the social as a site predicated upon rational
institutions and right-mindedness in public affairs and civic practice. The other, the less familiar
counterdiscourse – particularly in the Earl of Shaftesbury‟s formulation of a public sphere
consolidated through the fostering of affective kinship and sensibility – stressed the significance
of the passions rather than the intellect and envisioned a reintegrated social world achieved
through the exercise of fellow-feeling and the cultivation of affective relationships. This
counterdiscourse generated a popular form of sentimentalism that sought to re-envision the close
bonds of traditional society in a public sphere gone awry and indelibly pluralistic. This version
of sentimentalism became a default ethical position within such a tumultuous social sphere
characterized by difference, and, significantly, was utilized by the culture industry of nineteenth
and twentieth-century America. In various forms of mass media, the discourse of sentimentalism
offered itself as a viable and coherent solution to the ethical crisis posed by modernity. For my
inquiry here, I would now like to take a closer look at this approach, specifically in the
relationship between its rhetorical practices and the fostering of sympathetic feeling and
relationships in building an ethical solidarity and moral commitment among the public. As I will
argue, sentimentalist ethics must be construed as an attempt at salvaging ethical community in
the face of modern anomie. However, in its attempt to salvage the human in modernity,
sentimentalism, as Levinas would point out, consumes the human by abstracting and
generalizing both particularity and the ethical relationship.
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As such, the approach to ethical community on the part of popular sentimentalism is not
without its opponents. Among them, is the stance of the modernist avant-garde, which generally
viewed sentimentalism as an abstraction of feeling and as an unsystematic approach to ethical
action because of its relegation of ethics to the whim of human emotions and dispositions. As
several critics have argued, West can be read as representative of modernism‟s antisentimentalist
response to negotiating authenticity in ethics. In Miss Lonelyhearts, specifically, West
approaches the problems of feeling and sentimental community through a satiric bent that seeks
to expose these as inauthentic “ethical” solutions to the social needs posed by modernity. For
West, the need to overcome popular sentimentalism‟s rhetorical abstraction of the social world
and the precedence it offers to the human subject in the ethical relationship (in the self‟s
conceptualization of otherness through emotional faculty) is imperative to realizing an ethical
approach capable of moving beyond being and sameness.

One of the most striking passages in Miss Lonelyhearts comes not from Miss Lonelyhearts
himself, or from Shrike, but, rather, is heard in passing as West gives the reader a scanning of the
conversation at Delehanty‟s bar relatively early in the novel. A group of men – described by
West as Miss Lonelyhearts‟ friends, apparently from the newspaper – stand huddled together at
the bar discussing Miss Lonelyhearts‟ “approach to God”:
“Even if he were to have a genuine religious experience, it would be
personal and so meaningless, except to a psychologist.”
“The trouble with him, the trouble with all of us, is that we have no outer
life, only an inner one, and that by necessity.” (75)
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Although they have just previously been delighting in the mocking of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire
for religious piety, the commentary here provides a veritable recognition, a stark honesty, of
what modernity means to human societies and individuals. The absence of communal
continuity, formerly provided by cultural and historical tradition, presents a turning away from
collectivity towards the primacy of the self. Most importantly, as this conversation between
devoted bar revelers attests, modern subjectivity is characterized by an increasing interiorization,
and, as such, alienation from the social whole and the world of others. “By necessity” implies
two significant details concerning the relationship between modernity and the subject. First, it
suggests that emphasis upon human self-internalization (as in modern individualism) necessarily
means an otherwise irrevocable fissure in social participation and union – that is, with the
primacy of self-interiority one comes to view the world and one‟s place within it no longer as an
integrated whole but, instead, as a site of discrete objects apart from the self, distant from the
ego.12 What is not-me is not-ego and is outside; what is outside, then, is to be feared, and the
body (as the somatic site of selfhood) and the ego (as psychical site of selfhood) must maintain
an unassailable integrity if what is outside is not to be permitted access to taint the self. If not
monitored “by necessity,” as one of the newspaper men suggests, the foreign and the stranger
may be capable of compromising the I‟s self-security and personal comfort. In this sense, then,
“by necessity” means that what allows the self to maintain its integrity and comfort is the
severance of personal attachments, a deferral of engaged social interaction and participation in
order to avoid unpleasantness, suffering, and pain, which, however, is a severance that is much
more than just mere symptom of anomie but also existential fact. Second, “by necessity” claims

12

Levinasian subjectivity, with its attention to the irrevocable separation of the ego from participation, could only be
a product of capitalist modernity.
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that community has necessarily been uprooted and culture vanquished, and all that remains is the
individual alone in its isolation: “[W]e have no outer life, only an inner one.” While the dialogue
here gestures at the precarious nature of social attachment, ironically, these forms of modern
anomie indicate the absence of “authentic” culture and shared value as the source of individual
malaise and suffering in the novel.
What the social world of Miss Lonelyhearts lacks is a consolidated public sphere of
shared value and belief; the significance of ritual and symbol (i.e., morally substantive shared
communal practice and knowledge) has been lost.13 As Miss Lonelyhearts‟ crucifix upon one of
his apartment‟s walls testifies, symbol no longer acts as an intermediary of the divine presence in
things:
The walls were bare except for an ivory Christ that hung opposite the foot of the
bed. He had removed the figure from the cross to which it had been fastened and
had nailed it to the wall with large spikes. But the desired effect had not been
obtained. Instead of writhing, the Christ remained calmly decorative. (67)
In one of his retreats from the social world, Miss Lonelyhearts lays in his bed, attentively staring
at the crucifix and chanting, “Christ, Christ, Jesus Christ. Christ, Christ, Jesus Christ,” in a
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West uses the urban landscape of Miss Lonelyhearts to mimic the absence of traditional community and shared
value in the novel. When Miss Lonelyhearts walks across the park on his way to Delehanty‟s, he observes the
manner in which the natural continuity of the physical world has failed to recycle itself:
As far as he could discover, there were no signs of spring. The decay that covered the
surface of the mottled ground was not the kind in which life generates. Last year, he remembered,
May had failed to quicken these soiled fields. It had taken all the brutality of July to torture a few
green spikes through the exhausted dirt.
What the little park needed, even more than he did, was a drink. Neither alcohol nor rain
would do. (63)
Lacking fertility, the physical landscape hungers for a vital force that can reenergize the cyclical continuity of the
natural order. Mimicking the absence of social value, the physical world‟s thirst reflects the capacity in which the
reanimation of the social cannot be satiated through either alcohol-induced escape or conventional ideas of
community (“rain”).
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desperate attempt to animate its impaled Christ; however, the Christ refuses animation and only
remains mere aesthetic, “calmly decorative,” refusing to evoke the redemptive power that Miss
Lonelyhearts hopes He will. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire to animate symbol, to coax out the
divinity once evoked by religious images, correlates with his inept attempt to reanimate the
social world through his Christ-solution. In “Timid Defender of the Faith: The Prophetic Vision
of Miss Lonelyhearts,” Janet St. Clair points out the significance of symbol to Miss
Lonelyhearts‟ project of consolidating the public through faith and religious belief. Miss
Lonelyhearts, though admittedly misguided,14 as St. Clair admits, “[N]evertheless finds hope in
the eviscerated symbols that once connected humanity with its sources of transcendent power,
and he seeks to translate that hope to others through the vehicle of those original images” (147).
For St. Clair, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire to reanimate the social world is not solely informed by
the perceived need to invigorate the masses by providing them with religious value and
sustenance in their lives, but also by the necessity for Miss Lonelyhearts himself to arrive at a
supreme understanding of the suffering of his readership. “Thinking, working, and dreaming in
symbols,” she states, “he exhausts himself in the attempt to make them not only express a
legitimate meaning for contemporary existence, but to help him attain, shape, and organize that
meaning, as well” (147). West, however, exhausts all attempts launched by Miss Lonelyhearts
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Differing greatly from conventional exegeses of the text, St. Clair‟s reading of Miss Lonelyhearts is essentially
optimistic. For St. Clair, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ obsession with and performance of Christ contains within it the seeds
of resuscitating both personal and communal value in the modern world:
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ primary goal is to experience love. He seeks in love a motive and a method to
heal the breaches leading to violence, insensitivity, and disorder and to restore both the spiritual
and communal connections that humanize men and women. His “Christ complex” betrays neither
madness nor naiveté, but rather the supremely human attempt to locate and incorporate a
dimension of meaning lying beyond the mundane physical plane. (147)
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ search for meaning beyond the physical world, then, represents the necessity for human beings
to be capable of turning away from an essentially empty emphasis upon the intellect and the empirical (reflected in
modern rationalism and scientific method) toward the spiritual (God‟s divine love as well as its finite form in human
love) in resurrecting both existential value and communal solidarity.
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either to enable communal life or to comprehend the significance – the rhyme and reason –
behind both disintegrative social bonds and personal suffering in the contemporary world. St.
Clair traces these failures on the part of Miss Lonelyhearts to the changed nature of modern
society and social perception:
The problem, though, as his dreams of doorknobs, the lamb, and crosses testify, is
not that there is no hope for a source of comfort in the contemporary world, but
that either our shopworn symbols or our shallow and imbalanced modes of
perceiving them perhaps no longer afford us access to transcendent power…. If
traditional symbols have become vacuous, it is less the fault of symbols than of
the ruptured methods of perceiving truth. (150)
Unable to access the divinity of religious imagery and to extract personal meaning from religious
belief and value, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ social world remains apart, as well as adrift, in the search of
individuals for understanding and significance in personal suffering.
Nonetheless, the desire to give meaning to personal pain and affliction – to be able to
integrate these into a worldview that is somehow capable of redeeming human suffering and
bestowing value upon human life – drives individuals forward, in Miss Lonelyhearts, in the
pursuit of some sort of communal sustenance. In this sense, the value of shared experience and
of shared knowledge is found in their ability to provide an emotional, conciliatory solidarity
among suffering individuals who are otherwise alone in their personal torment. As St. Clair
claims, “The city, severed from its own personal and collective spirit, out of touch with both the
natural world and the symbols that might” bestow transcendence, “is not a community at all, but
a pathetic collection of isolated individuals, emotionally overwhelmed and spiritually
unsupported” (151). We might say, then, that the real value of community is not only located in
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the experience of sharing social values, but, also, in the sharing of experience itself – that is, in
the therapeutic knowledge of mutual experience and emotional support. However, the
deterioration of fully-integrated, organic community in twentieth-century America provides few
viable outlets for realizing the possibility of an emotionally supported and spiritually sustained
public. Rita Barnard, in “The Storyteller, the Novelist, and the Advice Columnist: Narrative and
Mass Culture in Miss Lonelyhearts,” sees this problem, ironically, as both the product of late
capitalism and the provenance of commercialized, mass-marketed advice in the America of the
1930s. Citing the work of Roland Marchand, Barnard states that the consolidation of a national
market by the 1920s and 1930s, contributing to the relative “demise of smaller communities,”
acted to create a vacuum of advice – that is, the age‟s “greater mobility, generational
discontinuity, the isolation and shrinking of households in the new apartments and
suburbs…tended to…disrupt the „informal, intrafamilial and intracommunity channels of
advice‟” shared by small, integrated communities (42). Mass-marketing, however, sought to
profit from this severing of individuals from traditional forms of advice by offering consumers
commodified versions of wholesome, down-home wisdom and knowledge, and as Barnard
points out, these were to be found in sources as diverse as comic books, consumer goods, and the
newspaper advice column.
When we are first introduced to Miss Lonelyhearts in the novel, we see him sitting at his
desk, laboriously attempting to compose his daily advice column for The New York PostDispatch. What he comes up with is nothing but pure commercialized rhetoric that promulgates
a feel-good sentimentality: “„Life is worth while, for it is full of dreams and peace, gentleness
and ecstasy, and faith that burns like a clear white flame on a grim dark altar‟” (59). In search of
some sort of moral response to his correspondents‟ pleas for help, Miss Lonelyhearts gives them
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a version of rhetorical sympathy propagated by a mass-marketing structure only capable of
recognizing the “needs” of the abstract market rather than those of the concrete individual, only
capable of cultivating ego-gratification on the part of the ethical agent and perhaps even on the
part of those receiving. But the presence of real human suffering and moral need cannot be
ignored when reading the letters of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents, and our initial
acquaintance with his usual correspondent fare introduces us to the problematic nature of ethical
response. “Sick-of-it-all” writes the following in response to her husband‟s morbid desire for her
to continue having more children even though this comes at the cost of risking her own life (due
to failing health) and causing tremendous bodily pain:
I am in such pain I don’t know what to do sometimes I think I will kill
myself my kidneys hurt so much. My husband thinks no woman can be a good
catholic and not have children irregardless of the pain. I was married honorable
from our church but I never knew what married life meant as I never was told
about man and wife. My grandmother never told me and she was the only mother
I had but made a big mistake by not telling me as it dont pay to be inocent and is
only a big disappointment. I have 7 children in 12 yrs and ever since the last 2 I
have been so sick. I was operatored on twice and my husband promised no more
children on the doctors advice as he said I might die but when I got back from the
hospital he broke his promise and now I am going to have a baby and I dont think
I can stand it my kidneys hurt so much. I am so sick and scared because I cant
have an abortion on account of being a catholic and my husband so religious. I
cry all the time it hurts so much and I don’t know what to do. (59-60)
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Next in line is “Desperate,” who is a teenage girl born without a nose, and obviously, very
solicitous about her future in such a state:
What did I do to deserve such a terrible bad fate? Even if I did do some
bad things I didn’t do any before I was a year old and I was born this way. I
asked Papa and he says he doesnt know, but that maybe I did something in the
other world before I was born or that maybe I was being punished for his sins. I
dont believe that because he is a very nice man. Ought I commit suicide? (60)
The letters of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents implicate human beings in circumstances far
greater than their control and comprehension. The central inquiry, here, more than just solely
asking for help, is how to make sense out of one‟s suffering in terms of one‟s morality. Sick-ofit-all‟s and Desperate‟s respective moralities do not seem to provide them with any sense of
value or redemption. Confronted with these prospects, why not commit suicide, they ask. What
this quasi-community of advice15 reflects is a characteristically human desire for emotional
support and solidarity as well as the desire to place suffering within a comprehensive moral
framework; this desire is met, then, in the newspaper‟s institutionalization of a sentimental
community predicated upon the rhetorical practices of mass-market sympathy and fellowfeeling. Our questions to ask right now, however, not only concern the viability of such an
ethical response as moral sentimentality, but also why mass sentimentalism might seem so apt,
so easily suitable, to the occasion of providing moral support and authenticating communal
experience in modernity, as well as why sympathy and affect seem so desirable in a capitalistic
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Barnard, whose critical approach to the text utilizes Benjamin‟s theory of the changed nature of shared knowledge
under modernity, expounded in “The Storyteller,” argues that the very character of the advice column signals the
absence of a viable community capable of translating experience into shared knowledge and wisdom. “We cannot
forget, moreover,” she writes, “that these confessions are letters written in isolation and confusion…, a situation that
already signifies the disappearance of that community of tellers and interpreters in which advice is possible” (50).
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public sphere where traditional social bonds and channels of moral support have been severed.
These queries take us directly to the confrontation between West and popular, mass media
ethical discourses of sentiment.
Though we must distinguish between philosophical and popular versions of
sentimentality (and, indeed, the latter most concerns West in Miss Lonelyhearts), it is important
to first place popular sentimentalism within the broader contexts of philosophical and social
thought. Sentimentalist ethics finds its origins in Enlightenment and nineteenth-century
discourses concerning the importance of sensibility. The perceived critical need for one to
possess sensibility was due to the desirability of overcoming the contingencies of an increasingly
demanding public sphere, where close social attachments were becoming negated due to the
rapidity of modern life and the impersonal nature of contemporary civic life. “To be endowed
with sensibility in its most attractive…form,” claims Andrew Burstein in Sentimental
Democracy: The Evolution of America’s Romantic Self-Image, “meant to have an enlarged
capacity to perform benevolent deeds, to show affection readily, to shed tears and empathize
strongly with human suffering” (7). The cultivation of sensibility, then, could lead to a stronger
social and ethical cohesion among the modern masses. As Burstein notes in regard to the Earl of
Shaftesbury‟s sentimentalist approach to the moral consolidation of the public sphere, “[S]ociety
was made strong and cohesive through the cultivation of intimate connections, the „natural,
generous affections‟” (11). This emphasis upon fostering affective relationships in order to
resuscitate an integrated social world corresponds with sentimentalism‟s positing of authentic
ethics as incapable of dissociation from emotional faculty. For the sentimentalist ethical school,
morality cannot distance itself from the ability of human beings to empathize with one another.
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In Fellow-Feeling and the Moral Life, Joseph Duke Filonowicz adeptly characterizes the
significance of passionate feeling and affect to sentimentalism‟s ethical project:
Sentimental moralists claim that in order to be fully successful, any justification
for practicing altruism, living ethically, acting with regard to the interests of
others, must appeal, ultimately, to human desires and emotions that are already
other-regarding and benevolent in some sense on their own, prior to any abstract
considerations concerning how one ought to live and act. Successful ethical
justification, in other words, must appeal to our sympathies, our natural concern
for others; reason, detached from affect, emotion, passion, can never supply a
satisfactory answer to the question, why be moral? or establish a general
requirement that we live ethically. (4)
Filonowicz reads a sentimentalist school that at once questions both the virtue and possibility of
duty and motivation determined through abstract rationalistic principles, as well as posits moral
action and intention as inseparable from emotion and desire.16 For this ethical project, he argues,
“[P]urely rational motivation, altruistic or otherwise, simply does not exist,” meaning “that
reason apart from desire is perfectly motivationally inert” and “that all motivation is necessarily
motivation by wants” (53). In other words, according to Filonowicz, it simply does not make
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Explicating sentimentalism‟s general “beef” with deontological ethics, for instance, Filonowicz calls into question
the morality of rationally-constituted ethical intention:
If a person acts beneficently, not from genuine concern for the weal of a fellow, but from some
other motive (dutiful routine, religious obedience, self-interest) we should perhaps be glad at the
outcome (a good was conveyed) but should hardly hold the agent in positive esteem for it. His
motivation falls short of direct, spontaneous and uncalculative engagement in other‟s good, of
genuine moral concern…. This can be argued; perhaps there is something too disinterested, too
detached in Kantian duty or otherwise rationalistic disinterestedness for it to count as truly
virtuous motivation. (53)
Intention, for the sentimentalist school, cannot be allowed determination by rational motivation, but, rather, must be
spontaneously directed towards the other in the natural, authentic concern of the self for the other‟s well-being. Any
ethical action separated from this spontaneous intention of affect is therefore dubiously “moral,” perhaps even
morally reprehensible, even if constitutively “ethical” in terms of right action.
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sense that ethics can work apart from emotion, and to avoid emotion, along with the
consideration of human passions, by “thinking” ethics avoids real ethical desire for the other.
Furthermore, and most significantly, this desire to resurrect traditional community
through the moral potential of human feeling and sympathy finds one of its most prominent loci
in the popular culture of nineteenth and early twentieth-century America. In order to repair and
unify a radically disparate and pluralistic society, the discourse of sentimentalism became
integrated into the cultural fabric of modern American society, meaning that sentimentalism was
now available as a popular discourse of morality for the masses. As a default ethical position in
a pluralistic America, mass sentimentalism served as an intensely powerful social discourse and
did indeed have real, valuable sociopolitical effects, most notably in the abolition of slavery and
improved labor conditions. A significant component of this discourse was the manipulation of
sentiment in media and literature. Both the novel of manners and the sentimental novel seek to
articulate the need for refinement and affective sensibility among their respective readerships.
Specifically, the sentimental novel reproduces and utilizes formulaic typologies of affect for
engaging readerly desire and ethical awareness. For Jane Tompkins, one of sentimentalist
literature‟s most avid proponents, these conventional representations of feeling and suffering are
not detrimental to cultivating a morally-engaged community of readers, but, instead, are
completely capable of stimulating an authentic social awareness and solidarity. In Sensational
Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction 1790-1860, Tompkins argues for a view of
sentimental fiction that realizes the potential of sentimentalism to connect the reader with the
reality of cultural and political life:
Once in possession of the system of beliefs that undergirds the patterns of
sentimental fiction, it is possible for modern readers to see how its tearful
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episodes and frequent violations of probability were invested with a structure of
meanings that fixed these works, for nineteenth-century readers, not in the realm
of fairy tale or escapist fantasy, but in the very bedrock of reality. (127)
According to Tompkins, the morality of sentimentalist fiction cannot be denied, particularly in
its ability to engage readers in the moral dilemmas and social conflicts (whether gender, racial,
class, political, etc.) of the day. Any criticism denying this capability on the part of
sentimentalism is informed by socially and historically contingent viewpoints. “When critics
dismiss sentimental fiction because it is out of touch with reality,” Tompkins argues, “they do so
because the reality they perceive is organized according to a different set of conventions for
constituting experience.” Tompkins continues by stating that “the real naiveté is to think that
that attack is launched from no perspective whatsoever, or that its perspective is disinterested and
not culture-bound in the way the sentimental novelists were” (159-60).17 All attempts, then, at
questioning the efficacy of popular sentimentalism in stimulating authentic ethical and
sociopolitical awareness must be attuned to the manner in which culturally-contingent values
inform our perceptions of systems of belief.18
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Filonowicz also recognizes the contingent nature of negative evaluations of sentimentalist ethics. For Filonowicz,
himself a contemporary proponent of sentimentalism, dismissal of sentimentalist ethics is informed by a rationalist
discourse that negates the plausibility of negotiating an ethics through affective cultivation:
Modern diffidence toward these earliest Moralists‟ [Filonowicz claims the early Sentimental
school as the origins of modern moral philosophy] enterprise betrays a phobia of antirationalism
or subjectivism that is itself likely to be highly historically conditioned. It perpetuates a
misunderstanding of their thought as well as an overly narrow and probably outmoded conception
of the proper task of ethics. (45)
Admittedly, it is easy to dismiss the validity of an affective ethics; however, what must be understood is the capacity
in which all approaches to formulating ethical systems of thought is shaped by historically-situated value structures.
18
Nevertheless, sentimentalism has its detractors. Ann Douglas, in The Feminization of American Culture, argues
for an interpretation of sentimentalism as completely oblivious to the realities of sociopolitical life.
“[S]entimentalism might be defined as the political sense obfuscated or gone rancid,” she claims,
“Sentimentalism…never exists except in tandem with failed political consciousness. A relatively recent
phenomenon whose appearance is linked with capitalist development, sentimentalism seeks and offers the
distraction of sheer publicity” (254). According to Douglas, sentimentalism amounts not to ethical practicality but
to mere commodified self-display. As she states, “Involved as it is with the exhibition and commercialization of the
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What Tompkins‟ defense of sentimentalism attempts to eschew, however, is the
problematic nature of realizing actually authentic feeling and affect in negotiating ethical
response, particularly within the rhetorical discourses and maneuverings of mass sentimentalism.
As the site of unprecedented atrocity, the twentieth-century spawned a backlash against the
Enlightenment possibility of consolidating a social world, as well as cross-cultural
understanding, through fellow-feeling and sentimental discourses propounding affective kinship
and brotherhood. One dissenting viewpoint was formally articulated and sketched-out in the
modernist suspicion of emotional and affective sincerity, whether in artistic practice or social
life. Arising in the aftermath of the hermeneutics of suspicion19 employed by Marx (ideology),
Freud (consciousness), and Nietzsche (metaphysics and epistemology),20 modernism tended to
view, according to Jonathan Greenberg in “Nathanael West and the Mystery of Feeling,” “[E]ven
the most sincerely felt emotion…as self-deception or ideological mirage. With modernism, in
other words, comes the suspicion that „genuine feeling‟ may not be so genuine” (589).
Furthermore, leaving moral response up to the emotional contingencies and whims of individual
self, sentimentalism cannot exist without an audience. It has no content but its own exposure, and it invests
exposure with a kind of final significance” (254). Douglas condemns sentimentalism for its formulaic
commercialization of human emotional faculty, which has its end purely in display and lachrymose indulgence.
Similarly, many of the twentieth-century artistic avant-garde situate sentimentalism within a sociopolitical
awareness gone awry. For Brecht, for instance, sentimentalism represents a bourgeois indulgence in mawkish
feeling as a result of inadequate cultural taste, as well as an avoidance of socioeconomic realities (Bell 162-63).
19
This term is often used to denote the “radical” thought of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. For Marx, the ideology of
Western capitalist societies requires false consciousness on the part of the people, particularly those in the base.
Ideology, or how a society consciously constructs and imagines itself, is, quite simply, not what it seems according
to Marx. Similarly, in Freud, consciousness is not fully aware of itself – that is, the self is motivated by and acts
upon unconscious drives, instincts, and desires that are not available to consciousness. Finally, Nietzsche casts
suspicion upon the tradition of Western metaphysics and epistemology with his perspectivism. Truth, for Nietzsche,
is not a matter of objectivity; instead, truth is “created” by the various perspectives and positions from which human
subjects approach and evaluate the world. These three thinkers are essential in creating a climate for skepticism in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
20
According to Nietzsche, even altruism as ethical intention is suspect. Conceptualizing a vitalistic worldview,
Nietzsche‟s positing the will to power as the “unconscious” motivation of human action attempts to rethink the
apparent selflessness of altruistic intention. For Nietzsche, the self‟s will to power cannot be severed from the
motivation and practice of ostensibly selfless action. In this sense, then, neither motivation nor action are devoid of
egoistic intentions (whether conscious or not).
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agents provides what many critics perceived as an inappropriately unsystematic response to
situating really engaged interpersonal interaction. Casting doubt upon the authenticity of
affective response (as well as rationalistic ones for that matter) in approaching otherness,
modernist antisentimentalism, then, critically engages the possibility of attaining a genuine
system of morality.21 Greenberg posits the reemergence of satire22 in modernist literature as an
attempt to reassess affective authenticity and ethical publicity (i.e., ethics capable of cohering
and integrating a re-emergent social world). In this sense, satire can serve a moral purpose in
evaluating, ironically, the morality of “moral” response:
[A]n important strain of modernism viewed the stringency and even cruelty of
satire as a means of escaping from what were seen as the inauthentic and
oppressive identifications enacted by feeling…. [S]atire reemerged as a powerful
mode of fiction precisely when inherited conventions for the representation of
suffering became discredited. (589)
Specifically, in West, Greenberg reads an author directly confronting the problem of
authenticating a potentially reinvigorated social world through the channel of sentimentalist
discourse.23 West, Greenberg claims, “[E]xplicitly thematizes the problem of feeling throughout

21

The avoidance of many modernist authors of directly confronting the sociopolitical world (for instance, in Joyce
and Woolf) has contributed to the unfair association of modernism in-itself with moral bankruptcy. As Greenberg
points out, both conservatives‟ rejection of modernism as libertine and the left‟s rejection of modernist elitism in
formal experiment and refined aesthetics (that ignore political imperatives) too easily skew the modernist project.
“Despite obvious differences,” he states, “both charges share a distrust of modernism‟s well-known rejection of an
aesthetics based in readerly engagement and sympathy, a rejection that is read…as a sign of amorality” (588).
However, modernism‟s interrogation of sympathy is an explicitly ethical project in a modernity distinguished by the
failure of Enlightenment discourses of moral action (rational and passionate) in both reinvigorating social bonds and
realizing a Kantian cosmopolitanism.
22
“[I]f the era of modernism,” argues Greenberg, “was one in which the proximity of man and machine seemed to
pose a greater threat than ever before, then satire,” with its presentation of “the human as mechanical, emerged as a
mode all-too-suitable for modernity” (590).
23
Greenberg, however, posits a West that is critical of both sentimentality and satire:
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his writing,” in which the “experience of particular feelings, particularly in response to scenes or
representations of suffering, becomes itself the source of conflict…both within the text (that is, a
character‟s conflict) and in the reader‟s reception” (590).
Other critics have also noted the importance of West‟s ironic brand of humor towards
informing his ethical project. As Justus Nieland argues, in “West‟s Deadpan: Affect, Slapstick,
and Publicity in Miss Lonelyhearts,” West‟s use of humor reworks the boundaries of communal
attachment in modernity.24 “[T]he radical potential of West‟s humor,” Nieland states, “lies in its
exposure of the limits of public and communal belonging conceived in conventionally humanist
terms – where community would be secured by sympathy and the logic of identity that subtends
identification” (60). In other words, West interrogates the drive towards ontological and
epistemological sameness and homogeny present in the desire of sentimental community. Satire
is key here because it implicates the self as inhabiting a position within a social matrix that it is
incapable of distancing itself from, and, for West, the self simply cannot abdicate the ethical
relationship because the suffering of the other is close and cannot be ignored. Distance, in this
respect, is to avoid ethics altogether; however, the self is incapable of this deferral – ethics is not
an option that the self may have or not have. Furthermore, Nieland construes this ethical
potential in West‟s ironic humor as an acerbic indictment of the self that would either establish a

Although West‟s fiction subjects sentimental expressions of feeling to intense scrutiny, it is no less
searching in its scrutiny of satire itself, and of the ironic or joking postures, often identified with
modernist aesthetics, that dismiss feeling…. West‟s fiction at once manifests and resists a satiric
impulse, and the push and pull of this ambivalence constitutes the central dynamic of his fiction.
Such a struggle, we might venture, can even be seen as characteristic of modernity itself. (590)
24
Both Nieland and Greenberg represent a new wave of contemporary West criticism that is reevaluating the
author‟s artistic project in terms of its sociopolitical and moral value. If not completely dismissive of West‟s
pessimism, these scholars, nonetheless, read an ethically-sensitive West who is attempting to both question
conventional morality and to work through the possibility of a characteristically modern form of ethical possibility
in the light of social anomie. I will briefly sketch out Nieland‟s view of an ethical West below.
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merely self-gratifying sympathetic bond with the other or otherwise seek to distance itself from
moral engagement and imperatives altogether:
[I]n Miss Lonelyhearts, our laughter, like our sympathetic identification with
either the subject or object of the violence, is foreclosed – stalled by the scene‟s
suspended presentation as neither fully proximate, inviting sympathy and pity, nor
sufficiently distant, allowing a consoling disidentification. (58)
Significantly, for Nieland, West‟s satire and irony can be viewed as preventing either full
proximity or full severance with the object of suffering. (Likewise, as readers, we can laugh at
folly but are also implicated within this folly as human actors.) While barring sympathy for and
identification with the object, West simultaneously posits the inability to completely distance the
self from moral engagement with the object.
Similarly, if we turn, now, back to Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ineptitude in dealing with the
needs of his readership, we see that West strands him between a laughter that would comfortably
dissever him from his correspondents and a proximity that would be solidified through
sympathetic identification, both of which, as West suggests, deface and dehumanize the other in
her incomprehensible particularity. In terms of West‟s antisentimentalism, this means that
sympathetic proximity, specifically, avoids the imperatives of the ethical relationship by
gratifying the ego and abstracting the other into a (comprehensible) object, now devoid of
alterity; however, West simply will not permit sympathy to abstract and generalize the need for
maintaining particularity in negotiating ethical relationships. Referring to the “epistemological
and ontological uncertainty of a rationalized and differentiated socius,” as presented in the letters
of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ correspondents, Nieland states that “[i]n this world of uncertain
feeling…Miss Lonelyhearts‟s project of sympathetic publicity – his desire to feel the pain of his
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mass readership…can only fail, indeed, must fail” (58). Miss Lonelyhearts (as well as us as
readers) is not given direct proximity with his correspondents (with the exception of the Doyles);
rather, they are mediated through a public discourse that espouses what is the affective desire of
West‟s portrayal of sentimentalism as mere rhetorical practice. In other words, Miss
Lonelyhearts‟ engagement with his readership is mediated through what West depicts as a
hackneyed and trite public discourse of sympathy and feeling that is suitable to an age desirous
of commodifying all things and thereby veiling the particularity of the world of discrete objects.
“Lonelyhearts‟s quest to „love the whole world with an all-embracing love‟,” according to
Nieland, “is thus comically confounded by both the uncertain ontological status of reified matter
itself and by the affective particularities of the social – the eaches and everys of feeling” (67).
Thus, it is “precisely these moments of emotional uncertainty, interruption, or incompletion,”
when Miss Lonelyhearts is suspended between emotional particularity and the abstraction of his
readers and social interactions, “where West frustrates sympathy‟s violence towards the affective
complexity of the social” (74). As Nieland continues, “Given his thorough cynicism about the
possibility and desirability of such totalizing feeling, West‟s gambit is to maximize the
particularity of the social as it suggests itself in the” pleas for help established through the
correspondents‟ letters, “epistles that bear witness to suffering of such a freakish degree that
Lonelyhearts‟s sentimental project can only fail” (67).25 Sick-of-it-all and Desperate frustrate

25

Interestingly, this endeavor to maximize particularity, as well as the complicating of both identification and
disidentification, is situated, for Nieland, within West‟s manipulation of the conventions of vaudeville comedy and
slapstick:
[V]audeville comedy oscillated between its jokework‟s social embeddedness – its sensory
immediacy and social topicality – and its disembeddedness – its affective universality. This
comedy‟s mass appeal depended upon its negotiation of the particularity (ethnic and otherwise) of
urban experience, yet its desire for a mass audience pushed it to elaborate reductive typologies, to
embrace putatively universal themes, and to cultivate broadly resonant affects through an
elaborate pseudoscience of emotional mechanics that would, presumably, reify a universal
emotional current coursing through the audience. (64)
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sympathy‟s desire for abstraction as well as self-gratification; the grotesque nature of suffering
borne forth in their letters emphasizes an individual particularity that necessitates an ethical
response capable of embracing the proximity and distance invoked by the ethical relationship –
that is, the claim of the other upon the I (proximity) and the other‟s claim to particularity
(distance). Turning away from his former participation in Shrikean irony and wit, Miss
Lonelyhearts recognizes the need for authenticity in ethics.26 Once again attempting to formulate

As Nieland further attests, this negotiation that betrays a dichotomy between the particular and the universal informs
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire for sympathetic totality:
American vernacular comedy itself depended on specific sentimental protocols to negotiate an
urban public sphere that seemed dangerously differentiated, or better, variously local. In this
sense, vernacular comedy‟s cultural work anticipates Miss Lonelyhearts‟s project of sentimental
publicity: both must negotiate an increasingly heterogenous public sphere characterized by a
vexing oscillation between the local and the universal, the particular and the typical. (63)
26
While I read this eschewing of Shrike‟s ironic stance, on behalf of Miss Lonelyhearts, as West‟s initiating a search
for ethical authenticity and possibility in the novel, Nieland, however, views Shrike‟s irony itself – particularly as
invoked in the deadpan – as an ethical counterdiscourse to modern communal desire. We should, according to
Nieland, “understand Shrike‟s frozen physiognomy not only as the result of reification‟s violence to the human, but
also as a kind of critical antisentimentalism that both precipitates and follows this failure to secure „human nature‟”
(66). In what Nieland describes as its troping of West‟s antisentimentalism, Shrike‟s deadpan prevents the
possibility of institutionalizing humanistic values within a consolidated public sphere of universalist affective
normativity. “Shrike‟s gesture unworks…,” claims Nieland, “and as such, its interruptive, historicizing gesturality
forms an alternative model of publicness and community irreducible to humanist notions of interiority and identity”
(66-67).
According to this reading, both comic antisentimentalism and ironic antihumanism attempt to counter
modernity‟s desire for a universalized conception of the “human,” achieved through the unification of a public
sphere predicated upon identity and sympathy, by resisting this desire and doggedly adhering to social alienation and
individual particularity, both of which undermine the logic of traditional community and sympathetic identification.
Shrike‟s “ethical” deadpan, then, along with his ironic wit, disarm Miss Lonelyhearts‟ attempt to stage what could
be construed by critics as a universalist, bourgeois public. Thus, for Nieland, Shrike‟s gesture is potentially ethical
because it resists the totality of affect and the category of the “human”; it mimics the alienation of the social as well
as modernity‟s inability to consolidate a community and a public through sympathy and ontological reification.
Utilizing Agamben‟s notion of the atypical, inhuman public, endemic to modernity, Nieland posits the prospects of
Shrike‟s (counter)public: “I want to suggest how Shrike‟s work, like his deadpan visage, demarcates the potential
for a noninstrumental, indeed ethical publicness that only emerges by accommodating, not sentimentalizing, the
spectacular emptiness of the modern public sphere.” Nieland continues by claiming that “the alienated gesture of
Shrike‟s face” is to be viewed “as a fully modern one, which is to say, resolutely non-nostalgic and nonrecuperative” (75). For Nieland, then, Shrike‟s ethical potential lies in the ability of his critical gesture to rethink
both the rationalized and the affective social world:
Such modernist anti-sentimentality, then, is…an attempt to sever sympathy from the affective
repertoire through which one experiences the reified public sphere of modernity, and thus, to
square comic antisentimentalism with alternative, and perhaps more ethical, modes of public
experience. (77)
What Nieland‟s celebration of Shrike‟s “ethical” deadpan gesture and irony fails to consider, however, is
the manner in which such gestures and actions are not just suitable to modernity in their respective mimeses of
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another sympathetic rhetorical display, Miss Lonelyhearts finds himself incapable of writing
(and laughing) any further: “[H]e found it impossible to continue. The letters were no longer
funny. He could not go on finding the same joke funny thirty times a day for months on end”
(59). Though he will, unfortunately, continue to grapple with sentimentalist rhetoric and its
correlate of ego-gratification (particularly in his Christ-performance), Miss Lonelyhearts
nevertheless consciously confronts the potential for violence, for other-effacement, in the very
nature of “ethical” response.

So, essentially, in its patterned, typological affective formulae, popular sentimentalism can be
seen as an attempt at reifying a differentiated social reality into a unified abstraction of
community. By placing the particularity of his correspondents‟ suffering and needs into a
narrative and rhetoric of sympathy and sentimentalist affect, Miss Lonelyhearts abstracts those
he would otherwise wish to help. West indicates that sentimentalist response and rhetoric only
homogenize alterity into sameness, ignoring the particular needs of the sufferer and his or her
radical demands upon the self.
Though West everywhere subverts the affective “logic” of sympathetic identification and
sentimentalist ethics, his critique that problematizes the role of emotional faculty in ethical
intention nonetheless presents veritable difficulties. A legitimate criticism of this approach to
ethical authenticity concerns the practicality of severing emotional intent from moral action.
How can we separate ethical action from emotional faculty, response, and engagement? Isn‟t
ethics, by its very nature, predicated upon the emotional desiring of the self for the other? As

public and communal discontinuity, but are egoistic endeavors at making the self as comfortable as possible in terms
of its relationships and interactions with others. Shrike‟s deadpan simply provides a façade for him to hide behind
in avoiding the suffering of individual human lives, everywhere present in Miss Lonelyhearts.
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Filonowicz‟s defense of sentimentalist ethics aptly attests, the possibility of distinguishing
ethical intention from emotional faculty is not only fraught with philosophical conundrum, but is
also potentially morally reprehensible, considering that ethical action for some versions of
antisentimentalist and antisubjective approaches to morality is no longer determined by right
intention (i.e., the desire for the other‟s good). Admittedly, West seems to acknowledge this
critique in Miss Lonelyhearts‟ emotional turmoil, which I think is an important reason why
West‟s antisentimentalism seems radically unique in the discourse of modernism. Indeed, West
appears obsessed with sentimentalism and with feeling. As the most emotional and
empathetically articulated figure in the novel (in both our readerly engagement with him and in
his ability to empathize with others), Miss Lonelyhearts seems to be the only character fully
committed to the realization of an ethical system adequate to the tasks set forward by modernity
– a desire rarely separated from intention (that is, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ intentional commitment
towards the other, viewed as his own choice) and emotion.
However, it is this very emphasis upon intention (in any conventional ethics, whether
sentimental or rationalistic) that, as I claim, West indicts for its dismissal of the ethical
relationship and its affirmation of this relationship as symmetrical – for a motivation posited by
the self is at bottom a testament to the perceived equitable character of ethics if not to the
transcendence of the self in its relation with the other. Bringing Nieland back into this
conversation, can we really put all of our stock in a West who simply leaves us poised between
proximity and distance in the ethical relationship? Although, admittedly, we cannot consume the
other‟s alterity through identification, nonetheless, we are, according to West, uncomfortably
close to the other. This proximity we cannot escape and cannot distance ourselves from,
especially not through the faculty of intention. For West, intention suggests condescension – that
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is, intention posits the self as transcendent to the other and posits ethics as equilibrium and
distance. “Ethical” intention, then, affective or rational, cannot begin with the self. One cannot
come to the other, in authentic ethical desire, through a commitment instituted on the part of the
ego; rather, one is commanded by the other to the ethical relationship – a command which cannot
be avoided or deferred as well as exhausts the ethical subject‟s moral capacities. As West
claims, ethics is the experiencing and re-experiencing of a traumatism that can neither be
conceptualized nor be therapeutically satiated, which explains why Miss Lonelyhearts is
constantly bombarded by a suffering public that he cannot understand nor conceptualize, as well
as why he can never do enough towards alleviating the burden of this command. This emphasis
upon the supererogatory demands of ethics brings West to a prescient anticipation of the work of
Levinas in re-imagining the possibility for moral action within a totalizing modernity (whether
bureaucratic, fascist, communist, capitalist, etc.). Instead of conceiving ethics as a structure of
symmetrical orientation, where the self and the other come together as a system of equity and
equality, both West and Levinas attempt to challenge the limitations of conventional ethical
understanding by citing ethics as an asymmetry, whereby the other remains irrevocably
transcendent to the I, constantly placing claims upon the self that both create and affirm the
traumatism of ethical subjectivity and moral desire.
In order to better grasp West‟s ethical gesture towards modernity, I would now like to
turn to an evaluation of what I deem as Levinas‟s ethics of traumatism. This ethics, with its
attention to the demands placed upon the self by the other, reworks ethical subjectivity and the
moral relationship, and most importantly, helps us understand the discomfort of West‟s
protagonist.
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IV. LEVINAS’S ETHICS OF TRAUMATISM
One approach towards understanding the ethical discomfort invoked by Miss Lonelyhearts and
experienced by the advice columnist himself is suggested by the thought of Levinas, who posits
as foundational to his ethical theory the inability of the ego to be made comfortable within the
ethical relationship. Like West‟s, Levinas‟s antisentimentalism is highly unique in the world of
philosophical thought. Both Levinas and sentimentalism (philosophical and popular) share
origins grounded in the perceived need to situate moral response within a non-reflexive – i.e.,
spontaneous – ethical commitment (the cultivation of which, however, is highly problematic for
sentimentalism). Furthermore, the respective provenances of each moral agenda are very much
indebted to the presence of suffering; however, Levinas‟s ethical traumatism takes a vastly
different approach to this presence than sentimentalism does. For Levinas, not only is ethics
prior to intention, but also the sentimentalist response to suffering runs the high risk of perverting
ethical response into narcissistic self-gratification. Besides, there is a certain moral smugness in
sentimentalism‟s position that suffering, for all of us, must indeed have a happy ending, so to
speak. To approach suffering in this capacity, as sentimentalism does, is, for Levinas, to
discredit the authentic27 ethical relationship as well as the presence of suffering. Discomfort and
suffering are a part of being, and we cannot escape these or the proximity of the ethical
relationship. As such, Levinas posits both subjectivity and ethics as traumatism.
But how exactly do we arrive at this argument in Levinas? The intellectual career of
Levinas is marked by the project of moving beyond Western epistemology and ontology in their
respective reductions of intelligibility and being to objectivity and sameness. Levinas
27

My use of the term “authentic” in relation with Levinas‟s ethics is different than my use of the same term to
designate sentimentalism‟s problem with realizing “true” feeling (as in the critique of Tompkins on page 30).
Authenticity, for Levinas, doesn‟t necessarily need to correspond with feeling, though we should be careful to point
out that Levinasian ethics never completely severs itself from the human capacity to empathize.
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specifically calls out his philosophical predecessors, most notably in Husserlian transcendental
idealism and Heideggerian ontological hermeneutics, for what he perceives to be their
contributions to the impoverishment of metaphysics. Ontology, according to Levinas, ignores
the metaphysical relation of the other with the I (also the ethical relation), turning both being and
the other into concept and generality, thereby esteeming sameness and the freedom of the self
above the other. “Ontology, which reduces the other to the same,” he states, “promotes freedom
– the freedom that is the identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the
other” (TI 42). For Levinas, consciousness cannot reach an “outside” position – that is, an
objective standpoint – from which it may view the world, making assumptions about knowledge,
existence, and most importantly, the other. Rather, consciousness is immersed within a dynamic
social world of otherness and strangeness – a world where the other impresses the weight of its
existence upon the I, commanding the I to response and to account. “A calling into question of
the same -,” argues Levinas, “which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same – is
brought about by the other” (TI 43). For this reason, then, Levinas claims that ethics precedes
ontology:
We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other
ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and
my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question of my
spontaneity, as ethics. (43)
The ethical relation calls the freedom of the I, at home within itself, into question, commanding
the I forward in order to account for itself before the presence of the other emanating from what
he deems the face – the manifestation of infinity and transcendence in finite form. The self
attempts to reach its ethical capacity (which is essentially unreachable) towards the other in the
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act of speaking, where the I comes to the other as a speaking subjectivity, as a giving
signifyingness in the form of saying. This giving of the self, however, is a vulnerability which
Levinas describes as the most passive form of passivity, whereby the I is completely exposed to
the unbearable burden of the other. As Levinas emphasizes throughout his philosophical works,
ethics is not an encounter of the self with the other in the manner of comfort, sympathy, and
equality, but rather, ethics is a traumatic event that deracinates the I from the familiarity of its
interiority (the chez soi) and commands a supererogatory giving and suffering on the behalf of
the self.

It is important to begin examining Levinasian ethics by acknowledging that, although he posits
the primacy of the other in his philosophical project, Levinas devotes much attention to the
nature of subjectivity in formulating his ethics. Alone in its interiority, the self “enjoys” its
“promiscuous freedom” and separation, what Levinas describes as its break from participation.
Levinas calls this form of subjective non-participation the work of the atheist subject who has
broken with God and the Infinite. “One lives outside of God, at home with oneself,” states
Levinas, “one is an I, an egoism. The soul, the dimension of the psychic, being an
accomplishment of separation, is naturally atheist. By atheism we thus understand a position”
characterized by “the breaking with participation by which the I posits itself as the same and as
I” (TI 58). The atheism of the subject is the irrevocable separation of the self in its freedom, in
the chez soi that is at home within itself and within its egoist enjoyment. The atheist subject
inhabits the chez soi, a position from which it approaches the world of objects, appropriating
otherness into a homogeny of the same (through the work of the I‟s consciousness). However,
this freedom is blind to itself and to being – that is, it is blind to the presence of the other who is
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always already before the I. Though subjectivity within the comfort of the chez soi is a
blindness, according to Levinas, subjectivity is also a confirmation of infinity and ethical
responsibility – a confirmation of alterity and otherness in their transcendence. For Levinas,
transcendence is “otherwise than being,” and subjectivity also betrays the otherwise than being
that repels the assignation of essence (Otherwise than Being 8). While a non-participation in its
atheism, subjectivity cannot disavow itself as responsibility; more than anything else,
subjectivity is responsibility for the other. As Sara E. Roberts points out in “Rethinking Justice:
Levinas and Asymmetrical Responsibility,” Levinasian subjectivity is to be viewed as “a kind of
response to otherness,” wherein “I find myself involved with others in the very moment of my
finding myself.... [T]he self is best understood as a kind of responsibility to and for the other”
(6). Subjectivity is not only a response to otherness, but is a responsibility towards the other who
brings, who invites, the self into the world as a part of Goodness.
According to Levinas, the Good is in subjectivity; the Good authorizes subjectivity and
freedom because it determines commitment and obligation to the other against the I‟s will (OB
10-11). The Goodness of subjectivity, then, consists in the self‟s obligation to the other, which is
a pre-ontological, pre-original necessity in that the other is always already present in the I‟s
existence. This is why Levinas does not allow for the I to determine its own commitment (as
sentimentalism does, for instance) in both its own duty and the ethical relation:
The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, in my
decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the
hither side of my freedom, from a „prior to every memory,‟…from the nonpresent par excellence, the non-original, the an-archical, prior to or beyond
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essence. The responsibility for the other is the locus in which is situated the nullsite of subjectivity. (OB 10)
We cannot equate ethical commitment with subjective intention in Levinas. The subject does not
come to the other having chosen this path for itself; rather, the subject is relentlessly commanded
by the other who is preeminent to the I, always already invoking the I‟s response and duty. This
means that subjectivity is vulnerability and exposure, which are a part of the Good as subjectivity
(OB 54). The Good is present before choice and will and is the necessity that obligates the I to
the other (OB 57). This, then, is why subjectivity and ethics are an-archical – that is, defiant of
origins. “Goodness is always older than choice,” claims Levinas, “the Good has always already
chosen and required the unique one” (OB 57). The presence of the other in the I‟s existence is
the trace of the Infinite, which confers the Good and responsibility. The I contains the idea of
the Infinite, meaning that the I thinks more than it is possible of thinking and knowing, and, as
such, the I is overflowing with the Infinite and the other.28 “Infinity does not first exist, and then
reveal itself,” Levinas argues, “It is produced in the improbable feat whereby a separated being
fixed in its identity…nonetheless contains in itself what it can neither contain nor receive solely
by virtue of its own identity” (TI 26-27). Infinity establishes the subject within an ethical
relationship with the other that can neither be ignored nor satisfied; it demands the subject to
assume its unique responsibility, which is a duty unto the other unlike any other (indicative of
the absolute particularity of both duty/obligation and the other). In “Ethics, Religiosity and the
Question of Community in Emmanuel Levinas,” Thomas A. Carlson adeptly characterizes

28

According to Levinas, infinity produces metaphysical desire – that is, the desire for the absolutely other that is
insatiable. “Infinity is not the „object‟ of a cognition…,” he states, “but is the desirable, that which arouses Desire,
that is, that which is approachable by a thought that at each instant thinks more than it thinks” (TI 62). Incapable of
containing the Infinite within the idea of infinity, the subject nonetheless is capable of desiring towards infinity in
the ethical relation.
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Levinas‟s sense of responsibility as an obligation particular to the unique, individual subject.
“Like my death in Heidegger,” Carlson states, “which no one can take over for me, my
responsibility in Levinas signals what is most mine and what is mine alone. Insofar as
responsible, I am singular, and, indeed, only insofar as singular can I be responsible” (60). Thus,
the self is always already engaged within a responsibility towards the other (and every other) that
is unique and unrepresentable, incapable of being placed into universalist assumptions of
normativity and ethical practice – the infinition [mode of being] of the Infinite that resists
totality.
But what exactly constitutes ethical experience for Levinas, and how does the self
attempt to fulfill its responsibility towards the other? How does the self come to a recognition of
its duty that is a taking, an affirmation of, responsibility? As Levinas claims, the I comes to the
other in the experience of its shame and guilt before the other‟s presence. This experience of the
I‟s conscience is a movement of metaphysical desire29 towards the other. According to Levinas,
the other “is desired in my shame” (TI 84), and moral consciousness begins when the I‟s freedom
is called into question by the experience of the other in shame, whereby the freedom of the I is
recognized as an injustice:
Conscience welcomes the Other. It is the revelation of a resistance to my
powers that does not counter them as a greater force, but calls in question the
naïve right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living being. Morality
29

For Levinas, desire is not lack or need, but, instead, is spontaneous and insatiable; metaphysical desire desires the
absolutely other:
The metaphysical desire does not long to return, for it is desire for a land not of our birth,
for a land foreign to every nature, which has not been our fatherland and to which we shall never
betake ourselves. The metaphysical desire does not rest upon any prior kinship. It is a desire that
can not be satisfied. (TI 33-34)
In this sense, then, metaphysical desire desires beyond anything that can complete it and takes the subject outside of
its comfort within itself as an I.
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begins when freedom, instead of being justified by itself, feels itself to be
arbitrary and violent. (TI 84)
Welcoming the other in shame and guilt calls into question the I‟s freedom, forcing the I into a
recognition of the violence it perpetrates, as an atheist chez soi, upon alterity and otherness.
Levinas deems this welcoming “as-sociation,” wherein conscience is a non-a priori (conceptless)
experience of the Other. “If we call a situation where my freedom is called in question
conscience,” argues Levinas, “as-sociation or the welcoming of the Other is conscience…. [I]n
conscience I have an experience” of the other “that is not commensurate with any a priori
framework – a conceptless experience. Every other experience is conceptual, that is, becomes
my own or arises from my freedom” (TI 100). When I experience guilt and shame before
another individual, that person possesses a power over me that I have no way of accounting for
or dissembling; she presents an enigma to me that breaks with my power to make the world my
own or to act according to my freedom. Additionally, this welcoming of the other, which is the
precondition of language, is predicated upon subjectivity‟s origins in justice, responsibility, and
obligation. “The welcoming of the Other is ipso facto the consciousness of my own injustice,”
claims Levinas, “ – the shame that freedom feels for itself” (TI 86). Freedom‟s experience of
guilt and conscience, furthermore, welcomes in as-sociation the possibility of truth, which has its
locus in society (TI 101). For Levinas, the experience of conscience is the self‟s vehicle towards
recognizing its responsibility towards the other which it has neglected,30 and it is in language that
the self approaches the other in its responsibility.

30

As Spargo points out, Levinas argues that our neglect of the other is a turning away from our responsibility, and,
thus, an act of violence and “murder.” Spargo claims that the bad conscience is significant here because it acts as a
means for the self to come into awareness of its neglected responsibility; however, this awareness is always
untimely and too late. “[T]he bad conscience is also oddly cast as a figure of mourning,” writes Spargo, “The moral
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As Levinas posits, language provides the network by which the work of metaphysical
desire moves towards the other. Brian Schroeder, in Altared Ground: Levinas, History, and
Violence, states that, in Levinas, “Language institutes the metaphysical (ethical) relation…. The
ethical self is desirous of the Other, not for the sake of possession or dominance, but to formulate
a dialogical relation” (108). Language, according to Levinas, is the force that cultivates the
metaphysical desire for the otherwise than being, whereby the I is made to open itself up to the
inquiry of the other31: “The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, is primordially
enacted as conversation [discourse], where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as an „I,‟ as a
particular existent unique and autochthonous, leaves itself” (TI 39). Language is a giving over of
the self and forces the self into a confrontation with the other that can‟t be deferred; language, as
conversation, calls the I into question, demanding the I to account for its actions towards the
other before the presence of the other:

subject‟s regretful belatedness – in which he comes to consciousness after the fact of murder – brings about
vigilance” (104).
31
Levinas distinguishes between two types of language: the said and saying. These two distinctions become most
relevant to his work in Otherwise than Being, and, although clearly in development, do not take precedence in his
discussions on language in the earlier Totality and Infinity.
What is explicit in his earlier work, however, is the distinction between conversation as speaking (which is
on the side of the other) and conversation as rhetoric (which is on the side of sameness and the I in its enjoyment).
Levinas describes rhetoric, then, as a violence of injustice that dissimulates the face to face encounter:
Rhetoric, absent from no discourse, and which philosophical discourse seeks to overcome, resists
discourse (or leads to it: pedagogy, demagogy, psychagogy). It approaches the other not to face
him, but obliquely – not, to be sure, as a thing, since rhetoric remains conversation, and across all
its artifices goes unto the Other, solicits his yes. But the specific nature of rhetoric (of
propaganda, flattery, diplomacy, etc.) consists in corrupting this freedom. It is for this that it is
preeminently violence, that is, injustice – not violence exercised on an inertia (which would not be
a violence), but on a freedom, which, precisely as freedom, should be incorruptible…. To
renounce the psychagogy, demagogy, pedagogy rhetoric involves is to face the Other, in a
veritable conversation. (70)
For Levinas, rhetoric (like the said) is present in all language, but the ethical capacities of language can be exercised
in the ability of the I to meet the other as face, which requires responsibility in speaking. This responsibility in
language is predicated upon both the face that presupposes language and language as saying. I will discuss the said
and saying, as well as the significance of the face to the ethical relationship, at length below.
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Conversation, from the very fact that it maintains the distance between me
and the Other, the radical separation asserted in transcendence which prevents the
reconstitution of totality, cannot renounce the egoism of its existence; but the very
fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over
this egoism, and hence in justifying oneself. (TI 40)
While language maintains the distance and separation between the I and the other (the necessity
of distance invoked in psychism, or consciousness), language also engages the subject in an
unavoidable confrontation with the other, who, in the address,32 commands the I‟s response. As
subjects, we sojourn in a social world where communicative interaction calls us to conscious
experience; we come into subjective awareness through the dynamism of linguistic structures
and discursive engagement. Therefore, as Levinas claims, “Discourse is not simply a
modification of intuition (or of thought), but an original relation with exterior being” (TI 66),
constantly desituating the subject and exposing the I to its vulnerability and nakedness. In this
opening up of the subject, the I is made nude and vulnerable (that is, laid bare before the other) –
the I is made to respond to the other as the I‟s obligation and responsibility. By speaking, the
other puts the I into question and becomes an interlocutor who disrupts the I‟s power either to
enjoyment (mastery and freedom of separation) or knowing (concept and thought) of the other.
On the side of the other is not only speaking (the other as the I‟s interlocutor) but also the
face that institutes the process of ethical interchange in social and communicative interaction.33

32

I would argue that the “address,” for Levinas, is not only the address of the other to the I in the form of the
“Hello” (the greeting), but is also the invitation to consciousness and subjectivity offered to the I by otherness. Both
addresses command the I to a response to the other.
33
According to Levinas, the face is the trace of infinity; it is the finite manifestation of the Infinite. In Toward the
Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas, Michael B. Smith summarizes this relationship between the
face and infinity as that of the trace to presence:

47

The face to face encounter, which presupposes language, provides an opening for communion in
the I‟s obligation and responsibility to the other; the presence of the face is already discourse and
speaking. “The face is a living presence,” writes Levinas, “it is expression. The life of
expression consists in undoing the form in which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby
dissimulated. The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse” (TI 66). The
face refuses concept and form; the other refuses thematization even as the I‟s language makes
him into theme. Regardless of what the I‟s language desires, the face speaks through the form
that would attempt to limit it (TI 198). Before the I, the face of the other is always nude and
vulnerable, and yet, it refuses the image and concept that claims to grasp it and would otherwise
limit it:
The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in
me, we here name face…. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and
overflows the plastic image it leaves me, the idea existing to my own measure and
to the measure of its ideatum – the adequate idea…. It expresses itself. (TI 5051)
The face is expression in Levinas, and the expression of the face resists the mediation of the
image, persistently destabilizing the form (concept) to which I attempt to appropriate the other
into “my own measure,” my own consciousness and language. Furthermore, the face, the
speaker who acts as the I‟s interlocutor, is always present in his speech, attending his own
manifestation as expression, and therefore, resisting what Levinas calls “vision” – the desire to
The concept of the “face,” which indicates the presence of alterity, is the mediating
concept by which the infinite is manifested in and to the finite. But the term “manifested” is not
the proper term for any effect or action on the part of the infinite, since the latter is characterized
by lack of manifestation. A demotion to the status of being would alter its quality of infinity. This
is perhaps why Levinas develops the idea of “the trace,” a more discreet form of evidence of the
presence of the infinite within the finite. (35-36)
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pin the speaker (the other) down into image (TI 296). For this reason, according to Levinas, the
presence of the face makes the world uncommon, in the sense that the other resists the I‟s desire
towards sameness:
The Other remains infinitely transcendent, infinitely foreign; his face in which his
epiphany is produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be
common to us, whose virtualities are inscribed in our nature and developed by our
existence. (TI 194)
By desituating the I‟s world, the face‟s expression exposes the I‟s mastery over the world of
objects as illusory and false. “The expression,” states Levinas, “the face introduces into the
world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power” (TI 198).
Expression is the imposition of the face upon the I, wherein the I‟s mastery is dissimulated and
its responsibility and obligation posited, thus making claims upon the I to respond as an ethical
subject.
The manifestation of the face confers ethical responsibility; it commands the I into the
ethical relationship as a responsible speaking subject – that is, the face commands the I to
approach it in its otherness through the act of speaking in the form of “saying.”34 Avoiding
ethical responsibility in language, however, attempts to defer the face of the other from the I‟s
presence and is aligned with what Levinas deems “the said.” The said, in its deferral of
responsibility, seeks to make the world common, seeks to veil the face that speaks to me,
reinforcing my sense of mastery and knowing. “The birthplace of ontology is in the said,” states
Levinas (OB 42). The said seeks out essence and entity, and as such, it is on the side of Being,
34

Saying belongs to the face in Levinas; it is the exposure that is the face‟s expression as discourse. As Schroeder
states, “Saying refers to subjectivity‟s „exposure‟ to the Other where the demand of responsibility and obligation is
impressed upon the self. This „pre-original saying‟…is expressed as the an-archic trace of the Infinite within the
face” (111).
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Truth, and logos. Any attempt of mine to speak about the world, to make it common, is the
desire of the said to thematize what is external to me. According to Schroeder, “The said is
language which makes propositional statements or declarations about the truth and falsity of an
event or thing” (111). As such, the said is an attempt at triadic representation, meaning that it
seeks to avoid the dyadic (and dialogic) encounter between the I and the other by moving outside
of and deferring this relationship and also by speaking about the world, making assumptions and
generalizations about exteriority.35
Whereas the said desires towards sameness and stability, saying is a disruption of this
linguistic network, whereby I meet the other as a responsible ethical subject, responding to and
speaking to the other rather than speaking about the other as well as the world.36 Saying is the
“proximity of one to the other,” it is “the very signifyingness of signification” (OB 5). Levinas
claims that responsibility is in saying – it “is put forth in the foreward,” posited in the address
(OB 5). In saying, the I approaches the other with giving and signifyingness, whereas, in the

35

The diversion of ethics to the triadic – that is, the third-person – denies the ethical relationship, which can only be
in the encounter of the self with the other in responsibility. In Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics
of Resistance, Simon Critchley describes the move from the dyadic to the third-person as a move towards symmetry
and equality. According to Critchley, the other can only be experienced in her alterity as the apogee of what
Levinas terms the “asymmetrical curvature”:
When I am actually within the ethical relation, I experience the other as the high point of this
curvature. As such, the relation can only be totalized by imagining myself occupying some Godlike, third-person perspective outside the relation…. [T]he relation between myself and the other
only appears as a relation of equality, symmetry and reciprocity from a neutral, third-person
perspective that stands outside that relation. When I am within the relation, then the other is not
my equal and my responsibility towards them is infinite. (59-60)
Defining ethics – that which is only within the dyad – as asymmetrical, then, means that the other (as manifestation
of the Infinite) is transcendent to the I; the ethical relationship between the self and the I cannot exist as an
egalitarianism but can only be experienced through the asymmetrical curve, wherein the other stands preeminent to
the self.
36
Ironically, though saying disrupts the said and the stasis of language, saying is teleologically directed towards the
said (OB 37). According to Levinas, the said doesn‟t have priority over saying but it does absorb it. As such, saying
is both an affirmation and a retraction of the said. Saying, as soon as it is conveyed, “is betrayed in the said that
dominates the saying which states it” (OB 7). However, saying goes beyond essence and is bound with diachrony,
which resists totality (the synchronization of the same). The diachrony of saying is transcendent in that is resists
history and memory‟s desire for synthesis and synchronization; the diachrony of saying is other than being.
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said, the I only attempts to ascribe meaning to the other rather than hold communion with him.37
As giving signifyingness, saying is an “unblocking of communication” and is exposure of the
self, whereby the self is made vulnerable by the other: “It is in the risky uncovering of oneself, in
sincerity, the breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, exposure to traumas,
vulnerability” (OB 48). In describing the process of saying, Levinas unleashes a vocabulary
invoking the traumatic, harrowing nature of ethical encounter and experience; saying – the
ethical encounter – is a dramatic and gut-wrenching interchange between the I and the other that
uproots the I from the comfort of the chez soi. The I is vulnerable in the act of saying and is
exposed, laid bare: “The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as a
cheek is offered to the smiter” (OB 49). Levinas claims that saying is the most passive form of
passivity (makes the I vulnerable before the other), the “for-the-other” of speaking, that denudes
the self before the presence of the other and desires the other beyond being, beyond the said,
even though such desire means suffering and pain for the self who lies powerless before the
other.
Significantly, saying as subjectivity – saying as the I held hostage to the other in its
responsibility – signifies the traumatism of ethical experience, and, therefore, ethical subjectivity
and responsibility lend themselves not to the familiarity of the chez soi but to the violence of
ethical encounter.38 My responsibility and obligation toward the other is preeminent to anything

37

Though saying seeks communion with the other, it also disrupts (like the face) the world that is common. Carlson
states that “„saying‟ does not join or unite, but rather separates me from the other, for the radical priority of
responsibility, which „saying‟ precisely signifies, dispossesses me of any stable, thematic language through which I
might mediate between myself and the other” (62). According to Carlson, saying brings together the “inequality”
that exists in the relation between the I and the other (which he describes as “a function of the irreversibility of the
relation”) with the “non-equality of the self with itself (a function of the self‟s irreplaceability)” (62-63).
38
It is important to note that although Levinas describes ethics as a violence, ethical violence – that is, ethical
trauma – is not to be conflated with the violence the I perpetrates against the other in its atheist separation, a
violence which is injustice.
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that I am capable of actually ever delivering unto the other and for the other; my duty towards
the other is excessive and obsessive, making ethics, for Levinas, supererogatory by nature. “In
Levinasian responsibility,” states Spargo, “we venture outside the permissible limits of
exteriority‟s obligating force (for instance, as Kantian duty) to find ourselves” in a responsibility
that exceeds any sense of ethical duty “we imagined, subjects suddenly not to obligations of our
choosing but, rather, to what lies beyond our culturally self-limiting constructs of obligation”
(17). Because my ethical obligation to the other exceeds, by far, anything that I can or may
deliver unto him – is beyond my capacities as an I – my responsibility and duty are never
fulfilled and always commanding me to action whether I will this action or not. As such, ethics
is a traumatism constantly weighing upon me – an unbearable burden that presses against any
capacity I possess whatsoever towards fulfilling my ethical duty before the other. Levinas‟s
persistence with his characterization of the ethical relationship as a trauma allows ethical
subjectivity to be viewed as the experience of what Critchley depicts as neuroses:
Levinas describes the relation of infinite responsibility to the other as a trauma….
In short, the Levinasian ethical subject is a traumatic neurotic…. The point here
is that, for Levinas, the ethical demand is a traumatic demand, it is something that
comes from outside the subject, from a heteronomous source, but which leaves its
imprint within the subject. At its heart, the ethical subject is marked by an
experience of hetero-affectivity. In other words, the inside of my inside is
somehow outside, the core of my subjectivity is exposed to otherness. (61)
As an ethical subject, the I is obsessed with the other that presses upon the self. This obsession,
this neurosis, however, is irrevocable, insatiable, and incurable – it weighs upon the self who can
neither be satiated within the presence of the object of obsession nor satiate the object of
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obsession itself, the object that confers selfhood and demands responsibility. One might argue,
then, that for Levinas, subjectivity itself is never fulfilled in the sense that the self is never really
all together there – that is, the self never reaches itself, never comes into its own (the self never
reaches and fulfills the capacities demanded of selfhood) because of the other‟s constant
desituating of identity.39 If indeed ethical experience is that of neuroses, then ethics and ethical
subjectivity seem to always elude the subject; ethics-in-itself is a presence of which the face and
saying are traces but which we, as ethical subjects, can never grasp or obtain whether in our
language or our actions.
Now that I have approached Levinas‟s ethical philosophy, with attention to both the problems of
ethical subjectivity in acting responsibly towards the other and the traumatic nature of ethics, I
would like to use the following chapter in order to advance my argument concerning West‟s
moral project. Shifting attention to the text of Miss Lonelyhearts once again, I will be placing
the novel within a specifically Levinasian framework. As I have suggested above, this approach
will help elucidate West‟s ethical capacity as an author who is sincerely attempting to come to
terms with the dissolution of traditional communities in modernity as well as interrogate the
inadequacies of conventional ethics.

39

This current in Levinas‟s thought is somewhat analogous to that of Lacan‟s; however, for Lacan, desire has
origins (though objet a – the petit object of desire – is always an unconsciousness – that is, pursued and experienced
by the subject within the unconscious) and is predicated upon need and lack (rather than spontaneous). Desire, in
Lacan, seeks to fulfill a void in the subject‟s existence. Both Levinas and Lacan, though, view desire as insatiable,
and, furthermore, the subject, for both thinkers, is incapable of eradicating alterity from the ego.
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V. WEST’S ETHICAL ALTERNATIVE:
APPROACHING MISS LONELYHEARTS THROUGH LEVINAS
In the pages of Miss Lonelyhearts, West offers a world where the human subject is precariously
poised between two options for negotiating interpersonal relationships: we may either ignore the
moral claims of the other, choosing for ourselves what is hopefully as easy or comfortable a life
as possible, or we may make a commitment to the burden of ethical imperative (which,
ironically, as in Levinas, is a commitment not of our own choosing because obligation towards
the other is non-intentional). For both West and Levinas, the deferral of ethical responsibility
through self-insulation can become a coping mechanism for dealing with the complexities of
morality and everyday life. Though we tend to think of coping in today‟s society as a positive,
therapeutic strategy in terms of personal health, neither of the two authors regard this approach to
situating one‟s place within a persistently traumatic world as ethically responsible. Instead,
responsibility is conferred by subjectivity itself and is assumed by the subject when he or she
embraces the trauma of interpersonal experience. In this chapter, then, I will argue that Miss
Lonelyhearts must be read as an attempt on the part of West‟s protagonist to embrace ethical
trauma as well as come to an understanding of what exactly this embrace entails. As West
gestures through the experience of his protagonist, this embrace requires the subject to be
capable of managing a public sphere mediated through a dead language and through a “culture”
of degradation that consistently balks the desire for ethical sincerity. Furthermore, and perhaps
most importantly, this embrace stipulates that the ego must be overcome, and, therefore, the self
in its freedom and enjoyment – the self as master and ego that would hide within itself as coping
– is the greatest obstacle towards responsibility.
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It is a particular hobby of Shrike‟s in consistently mocking the ethical impulses of his troubled
advice columnist, specifically targeting Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-solution for the brunt of his
ironic invective. After Miss Lonelyhearts storms out of Shrike‟s apartment in hot pursuit of
Betty in “Miss Lonelyhearts Attends a Party,” Shrike playfully reads the letter intended to Miss
Lonelyhearts from Doyle (a letter which threatens Miss Lonelyhearts for supposedly raping
Doyle‟s wife and betraying his trust), scoffing at the latter‟s religious stance: “„But I can‟t
believe it. I won‟t believe it. The master can do no wrong. My faith is unshaken. This is only
one more attempt against him by the devil‟” (120). If Miss Lonelyhearts is placed within the text
in order to establish a will towards moral sincerity, then Shrike is that presence in human beings
that degrades all pretenses towards piety and moral responsibility. According to Shrike, Jesus is
himself merely “the Miss Lonelyhearts of Miss Lonelyhearts” (65), pointing to what he believes
to be the ineptitude of both moral response and religious value. Analogous to his criticism of
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ethical desire as simple performance, Shrike‟s pessimistic portrayal of Christ
here depicts Jesus as a petty performer attempting to fulfill and enact the formulaic role of the
scapegoat that is sacrificed in order to atone for perceived sins and cultural failures, thereby
helping to regenerate a disillusioned society.
Not only does Shrike enjoy debunking the sincerity of Christ and his protégé in Miss
Lonelyhearts, he also takes a perverse delight in making the letters into objects for his
enjoyment. Reading the letters out loud for the amusement of himself and his company, Shrike
makes a game out of the inquiries of the correspondents40:

40

In The Fiction of Nathanael West: No Redeemer, No Promised Land, Randall Reid deftly evaluates Shrike‟s
parodic desire as his own unconscious parodying of self:
And the parody does not end with Shrike‟s targets. It extends to Shrike himself – a cartoon of a
satirist whose every gesture is artificial and whose stance is as derivative as it is destructive. Thus
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“Here‟s one from an old woman whose son died last week. She is seventy
years old and sells pencils for a living. She has no stockings and wears heavy
boots on her torn and bleeding feet. She has rheum in her eyes. Have you room
in your heart for her?” (119)
Delighting in his ability to mock and pun, Shrike simply reads the letters as objects that have no
bearing upon his personal life and his concern. Shrike‟s bit is to disembody the individual
correspondents through play rather than embodying them – that is, visualizing them as real
human beings with real issues and concerns – as Miss Lonelyhearts attempts to do. Shrike‟s
irony, then, helps to act as a distance between himself and the claims of the other. As Jeffrey L.
Duncan claims in “The Problem of Language in Miss Lonelyhearts,” Shrike‟s humor functions as
“symbolic consciousness,” involving “the displacement if not the annihilation of persons, their
particular reality, by words, a particular scheme of concepts” (119-20). Through his games with
the letters, Shrike is capable of robbing their authors not only of their individuality but also of
their suffering. Shrike‟s mocking stance aids him in disarticulating the words of the
correspondents and the actions of Miss Lonelyhearts, debarring their claims to sincerity as well
as their desire to make the world meaningful and valuable.
Though Miss Lonelyhearts‟ project is to (re)articulate his readers and the moral sincerity
of his society (obviously, his is a very flawed attempt), as we are aware from the very opening of
the narrative, Miss Lonelyhearts has also formerly participated in Shrikean irony. Like his
editor, Miss Lonelyhearts has also presumably reveled in the debasement of his correspondents,
taking pleasure in their effacement and laughing at their pathetic “humanity.” He too viewed the
satire is, in the person of Shrike, satirized, and mockery is thereby disqualified as an adequate
response to human misery. (44)
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letters as a game – jokes for a job he once considered a joke itself. However, unlike Shrike, Miss
Lonelyhearts cannot find permanent sustenance within this continual game of parody and
mockery; Miss Lonelyhearts, for whatever reason, no longer experiences the apparently
“intrinsic” humor of the letters:
Although the deadline was less than a quarter of an hour away, he was still
working on his leader. He had gone as far as: “Life is worth while, for it is full of
dreams and peace, gentleness and ecstasy, and faith that burns like a clear white
flame on a grim dark altar.” But he found it impossible to continue. The letters
were no longer funny. He could not go on finding the same joke funny thirty
times a day for months on end. (59)
Here, we witness Miss Lonelyhearts pausing in the formulation of a trite, sympathetic message
conveyed through the conventions of mass-publicity and consumerism, pausing in the formation
of yet another formulaic rhetorical move produced for the consumption of his readership. He
refuses to continue to laugh at the letters and decides for once to take them seriously. Indeed,
what he refuses as well is his alliance with the worldview of Shrike; Miss Lonelyhearts breaks
with his participation in a Shrikean irony that would otherwise erase the other and her moral
claims upon him. “Miss Lonelyhearts no longer finds the letters funny,” states Duncan, “because
he refuses to consent to this displacement, to bless this annihilation with a laugh. He looks over
or through their words to their writers, as he imagines them41: profoundly humble, genuinely
suffering, terribly real” (120, emphasis mine). For Miss Lonelyhearts, the very participation in
Shrike‟s game has shaped his consciousness towards a recognition of the need to move beyond
41

Even ethics and ethical consciousness can be uncompromisingly “violent” towards the other. In desiring moral
responsibility, Miss Lonelyhearts “imagines” his readers – perhaps a move by West to gesture at the ultimate
impossibility of the ego escaping the desire for concept and form.
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laughter to a sincere visualization of a suffering public. Furthermore, his participation in
Shrikean wit has made it impossible for him to approach the other without the sense of a
relentlessly persecuting guilt; the fact that Miss Lonelyhearts recognizes his participation within
his egoist enjoyment causes him agonizing pause to consider the manner in which he has
formerly effaced his fellows and shared in their erasure. In “Letters and Spirit in Miss
Lonelyhearts,” Mark Conroy argues that “it is his complicity in the initial exploitation that keeps
Miss Lonelyhearts from really fusing with his readers; true, he suffers as his readers do, but for
him suffering is indissociable from guilt.” Conroy continues, claiming, “The readers are
unknowing victims, but the columnist is knowing: a party to his own exploitation, and to the
same extent, that of his readers” (11). Miss Lonelyhearts‟ suffering, then, is not merely the
product of his guilt, but, instead, is his guilt in-and-of-itself.
Within this pause, within this moment of writer‟s block (which he will experience quite
frequently throughout the novel), Miss Lonelyhearts experiences his own guilt and shame for the
participation in an egoist enjoyment that has defaced the other who addresses him through the
letters. A breakdown in language and cognition, his writer‟s block has taken him to an
experience of moral conscience, which, as Levinas suggests, is the consciousness of an ethical
subjectivity no longer satisfied with its self-insularity and its refusal of responsibility. For
Levinas, the guilt experienced by ethical subjectivity intimates the presence of the other, the
claims of moral obligation always already present within selfhood. And for West as well, the
guilt suffered by Miss Lonelyhearts in his own participation in the annihilation of his readership
directs him towards the claims of an other that is, that demands, and cannot be ignored any
longer. Perhaps the greatest leap of faith taken by the advice columnist, his initial experience of
shame acknowledges both an awareness of the authentic demands of suffering individuals and
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the commitment to a taking-responsibility that is astutely cognizant of its own inadequacies.
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ writer‟s block is a guilt that cannot be assuaged, and, as such, is the
experience of an ethical responsibility very much aware of the inadequacies of language and the
mawkish commercialization of sympathy. He understands the newspaper game for what it is – a
simple rhetorical posturing and non-involvement – and realizes the inauthenticity of the language
of suffering and mass-publicity.
As I have discussed in great detail above, the conventions of rhetorical-publicity under
the capitalist culture of the 1930s necessitates a language of sympathetic identification in order to
cohere a public that is composed of vastly disparate parts – that is, the language of sentimental
affect envisions a public solidarity and morality through the affective overcoming of difference.
This rhetoric of sentimentality, at least as it appears in the language of the newspaper and mass
media, consumes the particularity of individuals and the ethical relationship within a universalist
narrative of suffering and affective kinship. “[W]hile each letter-writer‟s pain in Miss
Lonelyhearts is „singular‟ and material in its extreme physicality…,” writes Nieland, “these pains
are only legible through the specific conventions of the advice column to which the sufferers
submit.” This social discourse of mass-publicity, as Nieland continues, “subjects access through
processes of self-abstraction and disembodiment – the signatories assume names like „Desperate‟
and „Broad Shoulders,‟ abandon their marked particularity and effectively name their typicality,”
thus oscillating between “affective particularity and embracing putative universals” (68).
Modern mass-publicity, as such, mediates the particular through a public language of default
sentimentality inadequate to the task of Westian ethical responsibility; this discourse can only
universalize, pervert, and defer object-particularity. It is this very sentimental discourse,
characterized by Barnard as “a kind of pseudo-spiritual feel-good poetry” (53), which Miss
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Lonelyhearts must continually struggle against and to which he must, unfortunately, continually
revert. Additionally, his struggle against sentimentality extends to a broader struggle with
language-in-itself (that is, language as a structure and system) as well; the institution of language
is posited as essentially bankrupt and sterile by the novel – Miss Lonelyhearts struggles to find
the words to express both his moral sincerity and the reality of ethical experience. As Duncan
claims, the text of Miss Lonelyhearts “depicts language as radically false, a fundamentally
misleading order of being, or nonbeing, as the case may be” (122).42 According to West,
language makes the world and does not necessarily correspond with the world as it exists in
reality.
In this sense, language itself becomes an irony that presents its words as correspondent
with reality, as capable of negotiating metaphysico-epistemological certainty while it
simultaneously severs human beings from the reality it would wish to represent, thus staking its
claims, interestingly, with a Shrikean world of irony that refuses the possibility of substance and
meaning. Language, as nothing but irony, as that which belongs to Shrike, simply constructs an
illusory reality that pokes holes in the desire for an authentically meaningful world. Language,
like Shrike, devours the suffering of real individuals and challenges the adequacy of ethical
response, thereby perverting the ethical into nothing but the aesthetic (this is particularly relevant
to both the language of Shrikean mockery and that of sentimentalism). “[B]y moving the
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Duncan argues that Miss Lonelyhearts‟ realization of the inadequacy of words results in his fleeing from the
inarticulacy of language into the epistemological foundation of deity, of Logos:
[I]t seems to mean a flight from words in and of themselves to that only (as he sees it) which can
redeem them, put them in their proper place – a flight from the terrible logic of Shrike to the
Logos itself, Christ, the Word made flesh. The Word informs flesh, flesh substantiates the Word:
reality then carries a life-time guarantee, its value insured by language. (121)
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ intention, then, is to reanimate his social world through the Archimedean stability of a language
articulated through the Word, a presence that ensures both the possibility and the presence of truth and metaphysical
certainty.
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question of suffering from a moral to an aesthetic register,” writes Greenberg, “he [Shrike]
allows us to take pleasure in the verbal presentation of an otherwise painful situation. Miss
Lonelyhearts, won over by Shrike‟s masterful performances, has therefore become an ironist as
well,” doubtful of “final vocabularies…. But whereas Shrike seems confident in his ironism,
Lonelyhearts longs for something pre- or extra-rhetorical” (595). Although he constantly falls
back into the trap of linguistic irony and consistently reverts to its meretricious display of words
and concepts, it is clear that Miss Lonelyhearts desires to move beyond both the formulaic
rhetoric of sentimentalism and the ironic emptying of the world as invoked in Shrike and in
language itself. He realizes the dangers and inadequacies of any form of language (particularly
that of sentimentalism) in its consumption of the individual sufferer – the real – into a universal
narrative of emptiness. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ writer‟s block, then, exposes the drive towards the
annihilation of the other present in language as well as present in the self; writer‟s block points
the reader towards the potential of an ethical desire that moves beyond the reductive quality of a
disembodied community composed through language by actually taking up the moral claims
made by the other. This pursuit takes him to the undeniable particularity of flesh, of the face that
emanates from the other.
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ physical encountering of his readers is a necessity for West. By invoking the
presence of an other that exists in his radical materiality and cannot be so simply dissimulated
through words, West challenges his protagonist‟s ethical capacity. Though – as West suggests
through the initial experience of writer‟s block – the letters place the same moral claims upon
Miss Lonelyhearts, the flesh, however, makes claims that can‟t be as easily ignored by the
subject as those conveyed through disembodied words. The experience, then, of the public in its
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overwhelming “fleshiness,” in its grotesque particularity, as West portrays it, takes Miss
Lonelyhearts to the tumultuous, supererogatory depths of ethical obligation, as well as exposes
the self as burdened by an other whose alterity challenges the concept and form of language‟s
universalist impulse and interrogates the limits of ethical language. When encountered by the
materiality of his readership, we witness the revelation of an other that upsets Miss Lonelyhearts‟
capacity to act ethically responsible; furthermore, we watch a Miss Lonelyhearts that is
completely unraveled by these encounters and made “dangerously” uncomfortable.
It is no secret, however, that Miss Lonelyhearts is indubitably more at ease with his
readers as abstractions rather than materially manifest. The abstract, as he is well aware, is much
more manageable – its needs can be addressed and satiated. “Lonelyhearts is much more
comfortable with abstractions than material particularities,” suggests Nieland, “and this becomes
laughably obvious in the slapstick confrontations with the body of his readership, which he”
frequently understands “as obscene materializations of his letters, physical manifestations of
suffering that remain maddeningly unknowable” (70). So, for instance, when he meets Fay
Doyle for the first time, he is overwhelmed, as Nieland points out, “by her corporeal thingliness”
(70). Not only are Mrs. Doyle‟s voluptuous ham hocks overbearing upon Miss Lonelyhearts‟
conceptual understanding, but Betty also bombards his abilities to retreat into the familiarity of
form. Thinking that Betty is laughing at him in the “Miss Lonelyhearts and the Fat Thumb” (an
especially revealing title) episode, Miss Lonelyhearts searches her actions and face for signs of
cultural familiarity:
On the defense, he examined her laugh for “bitterness,” “sour-grapes,” “a-brokenheart,” “the devil-may-care.” But to his confusion, he found nothing at which to
laugh back. Her smile had opened naturally, not like an umbrella, and while he
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watched her laugh folded and became a smile again, a smile that was neither
“wry,” “ironical” nor “mysterious.” (71)
Miss Lonelyhearts finds himself incapable of abstracting Betty‟s otherness into the same,
incapable of narrating her through the universalist conventions of mass culture and rhetoricalpublicity. Significantly, the illusory distance formerly instantiated by Miss Lonelyhearts‟
linguistic and sympathetic abstracting of his correspondents constructs an image of the ego
deluded in its mastery – that is, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ former capabilities of curtailing and
controlling alterity through the conceptual work of the Levinasian ego veil his egoist work from
exposure as mere subjective dalliance and impuissance. However, corporeal particularity‟s
frustration of concept and of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ abilities to manipulate form causes considerable
damage to his egoist mastery and reveals the ego as essentially powerless to actually abstain
itself from the particular and ethical responsibility. As I have claimed previously, Miss
Lonelyhearts is – even provided his frequent delusion and ethical inadequacies – made acutely
aware of this. Though his proclivity for abstraction demonstrates a discomfort with the
particular, nonetheless, Miss Lonelyhearts does want – indeed, seems to need – the encounter
with flesh, the corporeally particular; only through this confrontation with the face (now
physically expressed as a finite manifestation of the Infinite), which expresses beyond form, can
he hope to possibly fulfill his ethical responsibility.
In his encounter with the Doyles in “Miss Lonelyhearts and the Cripple” and “Miss
Lonelyhearts Pays a Visit,” Miss Lonelyhearts has one of his most violent (both literally and
figuratively) confrontations in the entire novel, which takes him out of the comfort of the chez
soi and exposes the ethical imperatives demanded by the revelation of the face. As Lawrence W.
DiStasi writes of this confrontation in “Aggression in Miss Lonelyhearts: Nowhere to Throw the
63

Stone,” “Here the normally tenuous and distilled contact one would expect, and which in fact
Miss Lonelyhearts did expect, is breached and replaced by the total physical and spiritual
involvement delineated in the novel” (84). Sitting in Delehanty‟s, along with the rest of the
newspaper gang, Miss Lonelyhearts is power-tripping off of yet another wave of moral egoism –
so much, in fact, that his humility frightens Goldsmith, who “almost suggested a doctor” (108).
So captivated by his own humility, Miss Lonelyhearts becomes immunized to an additional
round of Shrike‟s ironic diffidence, to the editor‟s pretense of piety that only serves to condemn
such religious fervency. At this point, however, Miss Lonelyhearts and the others are
approached by a diminutive cripple, Peter Doyle, whom Miss Lonelyhearts has never seen
before. Both Miss Lonelyhearts and his cohort view Doyle as a pathetic form of humanity, a
grotesque manifestation of the reading public: “He [Doyle] used a cane and dragged one of his
feet behind him in a box-shaped shoe with a four-inch sole. As he hobbled along, he made many
waste motions, like those of a partially destroyed insect” (109). For Shrike, Doyle exists merely
as a means towards furthering his game of mockery; while Doyle attempts to ingratiate himself
as a comrade-in-arms, Shrike simply sees him as fodder for victimization. Once it becomes
obvious, though, that Doyle is not reducible to pathetic humanity, that he does indeed have the
ability to jokingly dabble as his ironically eloquent interlocutor (Doyle, the meter man, jests that
it is the “meter inspectors” of the world that have assumed “the place of the iceman in the
stories” [109]), Shrike storms away, denied his game. Whereas Shrike reads Doyle‟s wretched
physical state as the stuff of ironic play, Miss Lonelyhearts construes the pathetic cripple as the
stuff of sympathy and pity.
Doyle‟s grotesque corporeality is admittedly hard for Miss Lonelyhearts to stomach; in
fact, his instinctive reaction towards Doyle is that of revulsion. Here, a great test of his humility
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has been presented to the pious Miss Lonelyhearts, who must overcome his repugnance for
Doyle in order to fulfill his moral quest. As such, Miss Lonelyhearts initially attempts to
negotiate, to work around, Doyle‟s otherness through the act of sympathetic identification.
Immediately after Shrike‟s self-dismissal from the usual fare of empty bar conversation, Doyle
turns to Miss Lonelyhearts, perplexed and agitated:
The cripple was confused and angry. “Your friend is a nut,” he said. Miss
Lonelyhearts was still smiling, but the character of his smile had changed. It had
become full of sympathy and a little sad.
The new smile was for Doyle and he knew it. He smiled back gratefully.
(109-10, emphasis mine)
Pitying Doyle for the pathetic piece of humanity that he is, Miss Lonelyhearts sticks around the
bar, hoping to offer the cripple the possibility of camaraderie. Though Miss Lonelyhearts‟
sympathy may be somewhat touching on a purely emotional level, West makes it unquestionably
clear that Miss Lonelyhearts, contrary to his opinions of himself, has not humbled his ego.
According to Light, the barrier to actualizing Miss Lonelyhearts‟ Christ-solution is his pride.
“Its [pride] simplest manifestation,” he states, “is in man‟s revulsion from his fellow man, his
unwillingness to lick lepers…. Though Miss Lonelyhearts „wants to lick lepers‟…, he finds it
difficult to attain sufficient humility. Rather than uniting himself to the unfortunate, he pities
them” (92). Miss Lonelyhearts‟ sympathy does not involve him with Doyle; rather, his pity
implies distance and condescension – precisely the game of the newspaper business which he
repeatedly attempts to abdicate.
Soon, Doyle informs Miss Lonelyhearts of his wife‟s intentions to have the columnist
over for dinner that evening. “Miss Lonelyhearts was busy with his smile,” claims the narrator,
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“and accepted without thinking of the evening he had spent with Mrs. Doyle. The cripple felt
honored and shook hands for a third time. It was evidently his only social gesture” (110). At
this point, the two retreat to the back room, where they find a table to sit with one another.
Something unique happens to the columnist‟s great-hearted ego here – Miss Lonelyhearts‟ selfmastery begins to unravel, tossing him down into a world of chaos and confusion. He sits staring
into Doyle‟s face:
The cripple had a very strange face. His eyes failed to balance; his mouth
was not under his nose; his forehead was square and bony; and his round chin was
like a forehead in miniature. He looked like one of those composite photographs
used by screen magazines in guessing contests. (110)
He cannot appropriate Doyle here; he is unable to abstract his face into an order and framework
that befits his subjective world and understanding. Something about Doyle‟s grotesque
particularity, his radical otherness, is unsettling to Miss Lonelyhearts:
They sat staring at each other until the strain of wordless communication
began to excite them both. Doyle made vague, needless adjustments to his
clothing. Miss Lonelyhearts found it very difficult to keep his smile steady.
When the cripple finally labored into speech, Miss Lonelyhearts was
unable to understand him. He listened hard for a few minutes and realized that
Doyle was making no attempt to be understood. He was giving birth to groups of
words that lived inside of him as things, a jumble of the retorts he had meant to
make when insulted and the private curses against fate that experience had taught
him to swallow. (110, emphasis mine)
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Two very revealing occurrences take place within this passage. For one, we witness Miss
Lonelyhearts being made extremely uncomfortable. Both Doyle‟s face and the emotional and
cognitive toll of proximity and involvement begin to unsettle him, withering away the familiarity
and comfort of the self; the chez soi is becoming strange, and this vulnerability does not belong
to Miss Lonelyhearts alone. Doyle also becomes vulnerable in this scene; his “giving birth to…a
jumble of…retorts” reveals Doyle, reveals his ugliness and his nakedness before the presence of
Miss Lonelyhearts. Just as the Levinasian self is denuded and revealed, so too does Doyle spill
forth his guts, challenging Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ability to flee into the comfort of understanding
and familiarity.
What Miss Lonelyhearts has just experienced is the revelation of the face before which he
possesses no precedence – that is, he possesses no knowledge, no concept, no pretension to
understanding that may assist him in confronting Doyle. As Levinas suggests, in his rather
ambiguous way, the face does not only belong to the Infinite in its infinity, but also expresses the
Infinite as a finite manifestation. The face is beyond flesh and beyond finite comprehension and
delimitation, but it also reinstates the other‟s materiality (the other is both Infinite and flesh). For
both Levinas and West, the other‟s corporeal particularity serves as an expression of suffering;
when West portrays Doyle‟s physical and emotional states as repugnantly grotesque, he
emphasizes the “grotesque” nature of both subjectivity and ethics. Doyle‟s grotesque
corporeality mirrors the absolute grotesqueness of ethical response and experience – ethics is
gut-wrenching, intolerable, and anything but pleasant. Just as Miss Lonelyhearts‟ experience of
viewing Doyle is one of revulsion, so also is the experience of ethics, which cannot be avoided
much like Doyle‟s repulsive mug – both are uncompromisingly disturbing and unsettling. For
Levinas, as well, ethical experience and ethical subjectivity can be described, perhaps even
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reductively, as grotesque. As Levinas posits, the face goes beyond any capacity I possess
towards understanding or alleviating its pain and suffering. The face roots the I up out of its
familiarity and self-interiority and takes it to a mystifying, nebulous locus that transcends the
desire for comfort and satiation. Ethics is a taking of the bread out of one‟s own mouth for the
other, to the point of infinite self-deprivation, and even this is not enough. As such, we may
justifiably ask how we might ever be able to respond appropriately to the other. How can we
ever mitigate the other‟s suffering? How can we possibly answer that suffering in a manner
capable of satisfying his or her ethical claims upon us? As Miss Lonelyhearts soon experiences,
the answer to these questions is not readily available, if it is at all, and the other‟s suffering is not
so easily assuaged.
Turning, once again, to the encounter between Miss Lonelyhearts and Doyle at
Delehanty‟s, immediately after Doyle‟s muttered series of utterances, he takes out a letter he has
written to Miss Lonelyhearts. Initially, at this point, we seem to be right back in familiar
territory once again; however, something about Doyle‟s letter is uniquely different from that of
the other correspondents. Not only does he reveal it to Miss Lonelyhearts in person, but the
letter is also signed “Peter Doyle,” without anonymity. Attempting to rearticulate Doyle‟s
particularity, the letter also posits an honest inquiry, not concerning what actions one should take
in order to alleviate his or her suffering, but, instead, asking what the value of suffering is all
about:
“What I want to no is what in hell is the use day after day with a foot like mine
when you have to go around pulling and scrambling for a lousy three squares
with a toothache in it that comes from using the foot so much. The doctor told me
I ought to rest it for six months but who will pay me when I am resting it. But that
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aint what I mean either because you might tell me to change my job and where
could I get another one I am lucky to have one at all. It aint the job that I am
complaining about but what I want to no is what is the whole stinking business
for.” (111)
Doyle sincerely inquires about life and his position within the world – one of insufferable pain
and intransigent dissatisfaction. As John Keyes argues in “„Inarticulate Expressions of Genuine
Suffering?‟: A Reply to the Correspondence in Miss Lonelyhearts,” Doyle‟s letter is different in
that it doesn‟t search for solutions to his personal predicaments or the alleviation of suffering;
instead, it is a sincere desire for existential value. According to Keyes, “Doyle is not searching
for solutions – economic, political, domestic – he is asking Miss Lonelyhearts „what is the whole
stinking business for.‟ The focus is existential” (20). Here, Doyle becomes human for Miss
Lonelyhearts and for West‟s reader. Additionally, as Miss Lonelyhearts sits in his presence,
“puzzling out the crabbed writing” (111), he takes a step towards real humility, overcoming his
revulsion for Doyle:
Doyle‟s damp hand accidentally touched his under the table. He jerked away, but
then drove his hand back and forced it to clasp the cripple‟s. After finishing the
letter, he did not let go, but pressed it firmly with all the love he could manage.
At first the cripple covered his embarrassment by disguising the meaning of the
clasp with a handshake, but he soon gave in to it and they sat silently, hand in
hand. (111-12)
For Miss Lonelyhearts, the experience of ethical desire has moved him out of his selfcomplacency and comfort towards the other. He has humbled his ego through the experience of
suffering.
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If Miss Lonelyhearts has indeed humbled his ego here, then this humility is extremely
short-lived. The two leave the speakeasy together, “both very drunk and very busy: Doyle with
the wrongs he had suffered and Miss Lonelyhearts with the triumphant thing that his humility
had become” (113). The irony does not escape us. Miss Lonelyhearts is taking egotistical pride
and pleasure in supposedly not being egotistical, moral pride in not being immoral; however, his
“ethical” satisfaction will soon be disrupted and turned upside-down. Once he and Doyle enter
the latter‟s apartment and prepare for dinner, Miss Lonelyhearts sits quietly at the dinner table –
Faye‟s wonderingly flirtatious kneecap at work upon him underneath – attempting to recover the
sensation he had experienced in touching Doyle back at Delehanty‟s. He cannot, however, and
this seems to trouble him greatly. His only manner of responding to this disturbance is to search
for a message, a special meaning he can bestow upon the lives of Doyle and his wife: “Miss
Lonelyhearts made no attempt to be sociable. He was busy trying to find a message. When he
did speak it would have to be in the form of a message” (114). However, Miss Lonelyhearts‟
sense of the seriousness of the situation he currently finds himself placed into is balked by both
Faye‟s provocative flirtation and the Doyles‟ utter self-degradation. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ desire
for piety and humility is challenged by the Doyles‟ actions; his piety and sincerity are parodied
by their games, and he cannot be taken seriously as he desires:
The cripple started a sigh that ended in a groan and then, as though
ashamed of himself, said, “Ain‟t I the pimp, to bring home a guy for my wife?”
He darted a quick look at Miss Lonelyhearts and laughed apologetically.
Mrs. Doyle was furious. She rolled a newspaper into a club and struck her
husband on the mouth with it. He surprised her by playing the fool. He growled
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like a dog and caught the paper in his teeth. When she let go of her end, he
dropped to his hands and knees and continued the imitation on the floor.
Miss Lonelyhearts tried to get the cripple to stand up and bent to lift him;
but, as he did so, Doyle tore open Miss Lonelyhearts‟ fly, then rolled over on his
back, laughing wildly. (114)
Recovering, Miss Lonelyhearts once again pursues the obtainment of his message. Realizing
that he must say something and say it now, he stands up not knowing what will pour out of him:
“He had not yet found his message, but he had to say something. „Please don‟t fight,‟ he
pleaded. „He loves you, Mrs. Doyle; that‟s why he acts like that. Be kind to him‟” (114-15,
emphasis mine). Once again strained by the tax of writer‟s block, Miss Lonelyhearts delivers
what seems to be a sincere linguistic response. He does not know what to say, he does not
formulate a “message,” thereby perverting the current situation into nothing but a mere
manifestation of the letters and the language of sentimentality. Rather, his cognitive instability
actually does something here; Miss Lonelyhearts actually speaks to the other – he is saying
rather than participating in the said.
Unfortunately, as in the experience of humility, the experience of ethical response is only
ephemeral and evanescent. After speaking, Miss Lonelyhearts approaches Doyle and clasps
hands with him, and the two stand together, “smiling and holding hands, until Mrs. Doyle
reentered the room” (115). Making light of the embrace, she mockingly attempts to implicate
the two within a mutual homosexual desire. Infuriated by his wife‟s defamations, Doyle
positions himself threateningly, making as if he will strike her. Now, the situation has went
entirely too far, and Miss Lonelyhearts knows that he must once again do something to assuage
the personal antagonisms between Doyle and his wife:
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Miss Lonelyhearts realized that now was the time to give his message. It was now
or never.
“You have a big, strong body, Mrs. Doyle. Holding your husband in your
arms, you can warm him and give him life. You can take the chill out of his
bones. He drags his days out in areaways and cellars, carrying a heavy load of
weariness and pain. You can substitute a dream of yourself for this load. A
buoyant dream that will be like a dynamo in him. You can do this by letting him
conquer you in your bed. He will repay you by flowering and becoming ardent
over you…” (115, emphasis mine)
Aware of the failure of his “message,” aware of the language of mass-publicity creeping its way
in, Miss Lonelyhearts instead searches for another route:
With the first few words Miss Lonelyhearts had known that he would be
ridiculous. By avoiding God, he had failed to tap the force in his heart and had
merely written a column for his paper.
He tried again by becoming hysterical. “Christ is love,” he screamed at
them. It was a stage scream, but he kept on. “Christ is the black fruit that hangs
on the crosstree. Man was lost by eating of the forbidden fruit. He shall be saved
by eating of the bidden fruit. The black Christ-fruit, the love fruit…”
This time he had failed still more miserably. He had substituted the
rhetoric of Shrike for that of Miss Lonelyhearts. He felt like an empty bottle,
shiny and sterile. (115, emphasis mine)
Before spilling forth “the rhetoric of…Miss Lonelyhearts,” the advice columnist knows that he
has already gotten it wrong; he has found his “message,” but it is nothing but the empty rhetoric
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of the advice column and of evangelical hystericism. In telling the Doyles to become ardent and
flower, he has merely giving himself over to Shrikean irony once again. In telling them about
the “bidden fruit” of Christ that heals, he has merely sunk into the language of hysterical piety.
At this point, West asks his reader: is empty rhetoric even avoidable? Even when attempting the
sincere, we sink into the pretentious.43 Nonetheless, West makes us aware here that Miss
Lonelyhearts has indeed been hurt by the incident – that is, his inability to adequately respond to
his fellows empties him out: “He felt like an empty bottle, shiny and sterile.”
After Doyle leaves to go and purchase a bottle of gin, Faye once more takes up her game
with Miss Lonelyhearts, attempting to obtain his services in bed again. She makes several
advancements towards him, confident in her abilities to ingratiate herself and seduce him.
Frustrated by the inadequacy of his “ethical” response, Miss Lonelyhearts will have none of it.
Instead, he lashes out at her violently. “He struck out blindly and hit her in the face,” the
narrator states, “She screamed and he hit her again and again. He kept hitting her until she
stopped trying to hold him, then he ran out of the house” (116). Here, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ethical
impulse is severely complicated further – by attempting to avoid adultery and sin, he resorts to
violence. Ethical frustration leads to yet another ethical frustration. Indeed, ethics isn‟t fair (as
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The tension between actually involved dialogue and distanced rhetoric is never lost within the text. Several critics
have noted how this tension shapes many of the novel‟s incidents as well as shapes our understanding of the world
that these characters inhabit. Duncan reads a Miss Lonelyhearts that is constantly battered by speeches rather than
linguistic sincerity:
Miss Lonelyhearts deals primarily not with people, but with letters, with various orders and
disorders of words. In his personal relations he is not engaged in dialogue, the language of
spontaneous give and take, nearly so much as he is confronted with speeches, with words as
deliberately composed as those of the letters, if not more so. (117)
And Miss Lonelyhearts is not capable of abstaining from this rhetorical practice and posture as well. Indeed, he
does not seem capable of ever fully escaping this linguistic malaise as he constantly reverts to speech-making
himself.
Furthermore, this expressive predicament permeates the entire Westian world. As Barnard claims, the
masses lack any sense of dialogic function and expressive potential. She points towards the zombie-esque crowds of
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ “dreamlike violence” sequence. According to Barnard, “„[T]he zombie-like crowds…have torn
mouths,‟ a symbolic detail emphasizing the alienation of the masses even from any expressive capacity” (49).
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Levinas claims), but even more significantly, what we have with Miss Lonelyhearts‟ violent
reaction is an escape back into the egoist enjoyment of the self. Finding the unavoidable, gutwrenching, and grotesque nature of ethical experience too much to bear, Miss Lonelyhearts,
instead, flees his inadequacies and ethical trauma by resorting to a coping mechanism. The
suffering of his correspondents is overwhelming, so he lunges outward in order to counteract the
pain of his burden. What we are left with, then, at the end of these two chapters, is a Miss
Lonelyhearts who struggles with his moral pride, is unable to put ethics into language and action,
and cannot escape both the other‟s and morality‟s persecution. As West suggests through Miss
Lonelyhearts‟ ethical frustration, we may deal with the imperatives of ethics by pursuing one of
two options: coping – that is, ignoring the commands of the other – or embracing the trauma,
embracing the traumatism of ethical experience.
In Miss Lonelyhearts, the capacity to cope is exactly what can be fulfilled – it is simple and easy.
Ethics, on the other hand, is not. Not only does Miss Lonelyhearts find an outlet for his
frustration through violence, he also finds other coping strategies through his moral pride and his
physical withdrawals back into his room.44 Taking his Christ-solution cue from Dostoyevsky‟s
Father Zossima‟s “„all-embracing love‟” (67), Miss Lonelyhearts perverts the message and
power of divine love into an egoistic aggrandizement: “It was excellent advice. If he followed it,
he would be a big success. His column would be syndicated and the whole world would learn to
love. The Kingdom of Heaven would arrive. He would sit on the right hand of the Lamb” (67).
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ego doesn‟t just parry real humility; it also acts as a protective distance and
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We may view the sentimentalist community of the letters as another strategy of coping. Within this community,
solutions – especially formulaic ones – to suffering are readily available. As West claims, a community predicated
upon affective formulae does nothing towards actually solving and alleviating suffering (which is, after all,
insatiable).
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non-involvement that is constantly lurking within the subtext of his encounters and is there for
him to fall back into. Construing himself as a divine messenger of the Word of God, he
separates himself from both the God that he would serve and from the world of others.
Additionally, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ retreats into the “sanctity” and peace of his apartment help him
counter the overwhelming nature of interactive involvement. For St. Clair, “Miss Lonelyhearts‟
withdrawal is paradoxically most nearly complete and most communally and spiritually
productive when he takes to his bed to recover from the shocks of the world.” She continues by
claiming that “[h]ere he is free to imagine order, to dream in the living symbols of mythic
imagination, to assume a measure of mastery and control over the chaotic elements that threaten
to erode the respect he is determined to accord the human experience” (158). While St. Clair
reads his withdrawals from the outside world as ethically productive, Miss Lonelyhearts can
instead be viewed as attempting to escape the pressures of social involvement and ethical
responsibility when he takes to his bed, isolating himself within his room. The control and order
he is able to establish from his bed is merely illusion – another attempt of the self to appropriate
the world and construct exteriority as the self‟s extension.45

45

West absolutely refuses to allow Miss Lonelyhearts to relish in the enjoyment of his egoist mastery. Not only
does the suffering of the other dissolve his promiscuous freedom, but the physical world of objects itself
deconstructs his attainment of subjective mastery and his capability of totalizing experience. In “Miss Lonelyhearts
and the Fat Thumb,” for instance, we find the advice columnist “developing an almost insane sensitiveness to order”
(70). However, the material world debars its appropriation:
For a little while, he seemed to hold his own but one day he found himself with his back
to the wall. On that day all the inanimate things over which he had tried to obtain control took the
field against him….
He fled to the street, but there chaos was multiple. Broken groups of people hurried past,
forming neither stars nor squares. The lamp-posts were badly spaced and the flagging was of
different sizes. Nor could he do anything with the harsh clanging sound of street cars and the raw
shouts of hucksters….
He stood quietly against a wall, trying not to see or hear. (70)
Miss Lonelyhearts is utterly powerless in his attempts to categorize, formulize, and arrange both experience and the
world; his desire to make the external world into an extension of self is denied. As West suggests here, the self in its
freedom, the self “trying not to see or hear,” is a self that is coping with experience and the reality of ethical
demands.
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Significantly, the resort to coping is not endemic to Miss Lonelyhearts alone. Shrike, for
instance, finds therapeutic solace in the comforts of his ironism, which determines the dictates of
his worldview and existential outlook. In “Nathanael West‟s Miss Lonelyhearts,” Beverly Jones
describes Shrike‟s ironic cynicism as what essentially boils down to a systematic order of
nihilism:
As the modernist antihero, Shrike has his own system of order to shore
against ruin, an uncompromising cynicism made all the more impenetrable by the
fact that there is nothing arcane about its major tenet. There is no meaning in
anything, especially suffering, and there is no escape from it in this or any other
life. (197)
Shrike‟s irony, then, ensures him against the inhospitality of a world that refuses value and
meaning because this worldview negates the very possibility of significance in the first place; he
abstains from the whole chaotic mess of attempting to make life purposeful.46 Whereas Miss
Lonelyhearts‟ religiosity, according to Jones, is to be viewed as hypocritical and hysterical
(which, she claims, is exposed by Shrike‟s observations), leading only to violence, death, and
disorder in the end, Shrike‟s ironic cynicism allows him to function in a disenchanted world and
makes him an agent of an unassailable order and stability (196). However, Shrike‟s ironic
distance separates him from intersubjective involvement, deflecting the possibility of personal
and intimate attachments and thereby delimiting the enormity of suffering. Shrike resides within
a “promiscuous freedom” that takes no responsibility for itself, and, most crucially, takes no
responsibility for others. By ignoring and negating any signs of involvement with others, Shrike
46

What Jones‟ account fails to consider, however, is the manner in which the escape from the enchantment of the
world is essentially impossible – that is, even the claim to the dismissal of value is indeed a value claim. Even the
most ironic and cynical of all nihilists have their values. One might argue in Jones‟ favor, though, that Shrike‟s
ironic stance realizes the “irony” of its own claim and accepts this paradox of value.
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is capable of hiding within himself and wielding an illusory mastery over the world, which
makes living, for him, as easy as he can possibly achieve.
While Shrike hides in his ironic cynicism, Betty escapes the actual world through an
idealistic – and very clichéd – treatment of nature and rural life. Her utopian “bucolicism”
imagines the natural countryside as a therapeutic agent, capable of restoring both physical and
emotional health and capable of revitalizing life forms. As Conroy states, “Betty has already
made a cliché of nature, one which has been parodied by Shrike. Nature as an imagined scene of
plenitude is a figure of cultural fantasy” (15). Betty‟s delimited world is one of idealistic (and
idyllic) cultural production – the rustic as the site where all pain and concerns, things associated
with the rat race of city life, disappear and are vanquished. Indeed, Betty‟s naïve innocence
negates the real world and the real suffering of other individuals. According to Betty, things like
violence and suffering can be cured not only by trips to the countryside but also by conventional
medicine. Attributing Miss Lonelyhearts‟ psychosomatic malaise to urban life, she attempts to
recuperate and heal him through a therapeutic process that involves swimming in ponds in rural
Connecticut, eating warm soup, and swallowing down aspirin. Miss Lonelyhearts tells her,
“„Wife-torturers, rapers of small children, according to you they‟re all sick. No morality, only
medicine. Well, I‟m not sick. I don‟t need any of your damned aspirin. I‟ve got a Christ
complex. Humanity…I‟m a humanity lover‟” (72). Miss Lonelyhearts realizes that his illness is
not sickness as Betty would define it; rather, the issue is much deeper and not one that modern
medicine or utopian bucolicism can alleviate or solve. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ sickness traces its
provenance to involvement in the world. Betty, on the other hand, isolates herself from the lived
world of emotional engagement and unmitigated suffering: “Her world was not the world and
could never include the readers of his column. Her sureness was based on the power to limit
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experience arbitrarily. Moreover, his confusion was significant, while her order was not” (71).
Where the disorder and chaos of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ life posits the world as inexorably
demanding and meaningful, Betty‟s escapist fantasizing of the world actually mystifies the value
of experience and engaged involvement. According to Light, “For Miss Lonelyhearts, Betty‟s
order is a false one. It excludes not only suffering but also the spiritual needs of man. It
degrades man to a mere body and assumes that all his ailments can be cured” (88). And the cure
is what cannot (nor should it) be found.
As West claims in Miss Lonelyhearts, the ethical subject must constantly negotiate
between the annihilation of the lived world (the world of the other and the Infinite), involved in
coping, and the embracing of ethical traumatism and ethical obsession. For West, ethics is
predicated upon the necessity of the self to overcome its desire for coping, and, instead, embrace
the traumatic nature of ethical experience and subjectivity. Ethics is not in coping, but, rather, it
is in trauma. As such, the ethical moment reveals itself when the self is most overwhelmed and
most burdened by the other, who simply cannot be resisted or ignored. Indeed, as both West and
Levinas suggest, this experience is frightening and unsettling, taking the self to the very limits of
subjective stability (in fact, disrupting this stability altogether), which is why coping appears to
be so desirable. Nonetheless, this burden placed upon the self by the other cannot be deflected
through any process of subjective therapy – the claims of the other persecute the self always
already and from all around.
With Miss Lonelyhearts, we see that the desire for retreat often directly corresponds with
the moment when he is most overwhelmed and traumatized by the other. When he accompanies
Mary Shrike to El Gaucho, Miss Lonelyhearts immediately becomes uncomfortable with the
restaurant‟s invocation of celluloid cultural fantasy and commercialized homogeny:
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But the romantic atmosphere only heightened his feeling of icy fatness.
He tried to fight it by telling himself that it was childish. What had happened to
his great understanding heart? Guitars, bright shawls, exotic foods, outlandish
costumes – all these things were part of the business of dreams. He had learned
not to laugh at the advertisements offering to teach writing, cartooning,
engineering, to add inches to the biceps and to develop the bust. He should
therefore realize that the people who came to El Gaucho were the same as those
who wanted to write and live the life of an artist, wanted to be an engineer and
wear leather puttees, wanted to develop a grip that would impress the boss,
wanted to cushion Raoul‟s head on their swollen breasts. They were the same
people as those who wrote to Miss Lonelyhearts for help. (83)
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ refusal to laugh at these dreams and fantasies, as well as laugh at those who
eat at El Gaucho, reveals his awareness of the horrific extent of both human suffering and
emotional needs in the cultural landscape of twentieth-century America. This ambience of
suffering, as projected forth by El Gaucho‟s dream landscape, then, produces another wave of
sickness for him. While he is uncomfortable with this atmosphere, Mary, on the other hand,
seems right at home within the protective fantasies of cultural escape and the dream industry of
mass-marketing:
“I like this place,” Mary said. “It‟s a little fakey, I know, but it‟s gay and I
so want to be gay.”
She thanked him by offering herself in a series of formal, impersonal
gestures. She was wearing a tight, shiny dress that was like glass-covered steel
and there was something cleanly mechanical in her pantomime.
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“Why do you want to be gay?”
“Every one wants to be gay – unless they‟re sick.”
Was he sick? In a great cold wave, the readers of his column crashed
over the music, over the bright shawls and picturesque waiters, over her shining
body. To save himself, he asked to see the medal. Like a little girl helping an old
man to cross the street, she leaned over for him to look into the neck of her dress.
(83-84, emphasis mine)
Here, we see that Mary‟s desire to be “gay” is a desire for comfort and escape – the desire
manifest in coping. Miss Lonelyhearts seems aware of this and wonders if he is sick because he
possesses an attraction towards being made uncomfortable (though this attraction is obviously
ambivalent and often evanescent). His correspondents are present in his conscience and “crash”
over the objects of merriment garnishing the restaurant, emphasizing the self‟s inability to be
made comfortable and to reside within its freedom and enjoyment (the protective space of the
ego that copes) as well as suggesting the inability of the self to be made “gay” in the ethical
relationship.47 For West, ethical conscience is like the experience of an illness, wherein the self
cannot be made well and comfortable. However, Miss Lonelyhearts simply is unable to fully
come to terms with this realization, with the burden placed upon him by the other, and he thus
attempts to save himself from this awareness by escaping to the spectacle of Mary‟s medalbedecked bosom, thereby ignoring both suffering and the other.

47

According to West, to be “gay,” to be comfortable, is to ignore the ethical command of the other. Revealingly,
within this scene, Mary also relates the story of her mother‟s death from breast cancer and of her father‟s neglect:
“„My mother died of cancer of the breast,‟ she said in a brave voice, like a little girl reciting at a party. „She died
leaning over a table. My father was a portrait painter. He led a very gay life. He mistreated my mother‟” (85,
emphasis mine).
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Nonetheless, the extent to which the other seems to be present in Miss Lonelyhearts‟
moral conscience presents a radical reevaluation of ethical experience and subjectivity. In “Miss
Lonelyhearts in the Dismal Swamp,” the advice columnist once again becomes physically sick
and takes to his bed. Soon, Betty begins visiting, bringing soup and chicken in order to nourish
him back to health. Significantly, it appears here as if he is so burdened by the other that his
sickness is the symptom of ethical obligation:
He knew that she believed he did not want to get well, yet he followed her
instructions because he realized that his present sickness was unimportant. It was
merely a trick by his body to relieve one more profound.
Whenever he mentioned the letters or Christ, she changed the subject to
tell long stories about life on a farm. She seemed to think that if he never talked
about these things, his body would get well, that if his body got well everything
would be well. (99)
Miss Lonelyhearts‟ physical ailments translate into the moral ailments of ethical obligation and
burden. Indeed, his own suffering becomes directly invoked and produced through the other.
Coming close to a Levinasian formulation of Miss Lonelyhearts‟ suffering, Greenberg suggests
that this suffering is “related to, amplified by, and perhaps even produced from the suffering of
those around” him (594). Like in sickness, where the agent of illness is outside yet penetrates
the body‟s boundaries (it is both outside and inside) to exist and “traumatize” within, the other
produces Miss Lonelyhearts‟ suffering and crashes upon his moral conscience. He is absolutely
unable to escape this suffering and incapable of disrupting the demands of ethical traumatism.
West‟s stress upon the production of the self‟s suffering as emanating from the other who
is always already emphasizes the non-intentional nature of ethics. In Miss Lonelyhearts, while
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the self is certainly “free” to do whatever it pleases, ethical experience cannot, however, be
chosen; rather, ethics chooses us and chooses subjectivity. This directly links West with
Levinasian ethical traumatism. As Spargo notes, ethical sincerity and responsibility are, for
Levinas, not equivalent with the subject‟s intentions; instead, these are anterior to the subject‟s
choosing:
Ethical sincerity does not designate the choice to abide by an obligation or to
represent oneself straightforwardly or even to do what is best by the other….
Denoted only as an inability to get out of the way of the other, Levinasian
sincerity entails an absence of choice, the impossibility of beginning from any
point other than the self as a site of vulnerability already signified as being-forthe-other. As soon as one joins sincerity to intention…, one introduces a
symbolism that deflects the ethical meaning of the other. (97-98)
For Levinas, the subject simply cannot intend itself towards the other as a commitment chosen
out of its own autonomy. The commitment towards the other is established, rather, by the other
and infinity. For this reason, then, subjectivity belongs to the traumatism of the other, and
ethical responsibility persistently persecutes the self. According to Levinas, responsibility is “a
response answering to a non-thematizable provocation and thus a non-vocation, a trauma” (OB
12). “The-one-for-the-other” of responsibility is not commitment, which presupposes a
consciousness that freely consents to come to the other (136-37). Rather, responsibility and
obligation are a giving-over of the self that persecutes the I and places an unbearable burden
upon it. Responsibility is a giving that is painful and supererogatory. “To give, to-be-foranother, despite oneself, but in interrupting the for-oneself,” Levinas argues, “is to take the bread
out of one‟s own mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one‟s own fasting” (OB 56).
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Similarly, West realizes the necessity of embracing suffering and trauma, which is why
his protagonist possesses a need for inviting suffering: “Turning back to his desk, he picked up a
bulky letter in a dirty envelope. He read it for the same reason that an animal tears at a wounded
foot: to hurt the pain” (104). If Miss Lonelyhearts is willing to embrace trauma, it is,
nevertheless, an embrace that is both woefully inept and brief. The novel‟s final chapters
ultimately reveal the burden of ethical demands as essentially far too much for him to bear. In
“Miss Lonelyhearts and the Party Dress,” his ego has become larger than ever as he assumes his
identification with “the rock.” As “the rock,” he no longer feels the guilt of ethical demands:
“He did not feel guilty. He did not feel. The rock was a solidification of his feeling, his
conscience, his sense of reality, his self-knowledge” (123-24). Furthermore, whereas the world
of others previously resisted his proclivity towards abstraction, it now lends itself freely to this
impulse as Miss Lonelyhearts abstracts both himself and Betty during the height of a serious
confrontation concerning her pregnancy and their future together:
When she was quiet, he asked her to marry him.
“No,” she said. “I‟m going to have an abortion.”
“Please marry me.” He pleaded just as he had pleaded with her to have a
soda.
He begged the party dress to marry him, saying all the things it expected
to hear, all the things that went with strawberry sodas and farms in Connecticut.
He was just what the party dress wanted him to be: simple and sweet, whimsical
and poetic, a trifle collegiate yet very masculine. (123)
Reducing being, the other, and communicative action to concept and essence, Miss Lonelyhearts
renounces the ethical desire invoked in saying and responsibility; he has become completely
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comfortable within his freedom. By the final chapter, “Miss Lonelyhearts Has a Religious
Experience,” he is so isolated within his egoist enjoyment that he actually begins to project God
– that is, he identifies with an image of God that conforms solely to his enlarged sense of self, he
speaks God for God. “He immediately began to plan a new life and his future conduct as Miss
Lonelyhearts,” states the narrator, “He submitted drafts of his column to God and God approved
them. God approved his every thought” (123). Thinking that God has sent Doyle to him so he
can “perform a miracle and be certain of his conversion,” Miss Lonelyhearts negates Doyle‟s
particularity by turning Doyle‟s shout into the voice of all his correspondents:
He did not understand the cripple‟s shout and heard it as a cry for help from
Desperate, Harold S., Catholic-mother, Broken-hearted, Broad-shoulders, Sick-ofit-all, Disillusioned-with-tubercular-husband. He was running to succor them
with love. (126)
In the end, Miss Lonelyhearts is incapable of breaking with the impulse towards abstraction
present in subjective categorization and totality. Absolute particularity necessitated by ethics
reveals itself as absolutely impossible, and the “destructive” force of ethical obligation proves
too demanding for the self.
Indeed, at face value, Miss Lonelyhearts fails at ethics – his is a cataclysmic failure.
However, this failure is of a far different order than the ethical failure of the world in which he
lives. Miss Lonelyhearts fails for sure, but it is a significant failure. What his failure and death
scene reveal is the inability to ever fulfill one‟s ethical duties and obligations. Within Westian
and Levinasian ethics, obligation is infinite, and, therefore, insatiable. The revelation that Miss
Lonelyhearts‟ ethical struggle is completely overwhelming and utterly fraught with hysteria
implicates him within a drama of traumatism that indicates the absolute power and force of
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obligation. A significant failure, Miss Lonelyhearts‟ ethical inadequacy points towards a
traumatic conceptualization of ethical experience. For West and Levinas, it is the moments when
trauma most burdens, when we are the most traumatized due to our failures and inadequacies,
that the way becomes illuminated.

Though ethical frustration seems unavoidable in the novel (and, indeed, it is), nevertheless, West
locates the possibility of ethical experience within the moment of writer‟s block. It is precisely
when Miss Lonelyhearts doesn‟t know what to do, doesn‟t know how to respond to the other, the
times when he is most traumatized, that instantiates the ethical moment. Within these moments
of writer‟s block, brief as they may be, Miss Lonelyhearts experiences the asymmetry of ethical
responsibility – that is, he recognizes the apogee of the other who occupies the transcendent
space that commands the self forward. Metaphysical desire manifests itself during writer‟s
block, cognitive gaps revealing the I‟s freedom and spontaneity as essentially bound with the
other. What is revealed is the absence of any code of ethical action available for the self to
appropriate. As such, writer‟s block, for both Miss Lonelyhearts and West, is the debarment and
overcoming of rhetorical-publicity and insincere response. As Levinas claims, this overcoming
of rhetoric brings us to justice, which consists in the mastery of the other:
Justice consists in recognizing in the Other my master…. Justice is the
recognition of his privilege qua Other and his mastery, is access to the Other
outside of rhetoric, which is ruse, emprise, and exploitation. And in this sense
justice coincides with the overcoming of rhetoric. (TI 72)
During the ethical moment of writer‟s block, then, Miss Lonelyhearts refuses to exploit the other
by reducing her to a rhetorical formulation; his moment of cognitive and linguistic breakdown
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reveals itself as saying though he does not have to even speak a word. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ very
vulnerability and exposure unveil themselves before the presence of the other, and thus, he
signifies his responsibility. For Levinas, this exposure of the self in saying “is thus exposing of
the exposure, saying, saying that does not say a word, that signifies, that, as responsibility, is
signification itself, the-one-for-the-other” (OB 151). According to both Levinas and West, ethics
and communication are dangerous games, involving uncertainty and sacrifice – a giving-over of
the self to the other who commands and makes vulnerable.
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VI. CONCLUSION
To site ethics as traumatism and supererogatory giving, as West and Levinas do, presents some
significant challenges, however, to notions of ethical responsibility and moral action.
Admittedly, it is not difficult to construe either author as potentially ethically bankrupt and
irresponsible. Indeed, their own words lend themselves quite well to this criticism. “In saying
suffering signifies in the form of giving,” argues Levinas, “even if the price of signification is
that the subject run the risk of suffering without reason. If the subject did not run this risk, pain
would lose its very painfulness” (OB 50). Furthermore, Levinas claims that the I is responsible
even for the persecuting perpetrated by the other. To this effect, then, he equates ethical
responsibility with a maternity:
In maternity what signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of
substitution for others and suffering both from the effect of persecution and from
the persecuting itself in which the persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing
par excellence, bears even responsibility for the persecuting by the persecutor.
(75)
Not only do the other‟s claims persecute the self, but the self is also responsible for the
persecution committed by others. West, similarly, also runs the risk of sinking into
irresponsibility. Miss Lonelyhearts‟ willingness to endure the other‟s suffering risks a
masochistic pleasure that is not a taking-responsibility, but is, instead, an indulgence in self: “He
read it [the letter] for the same reason that an animal tears at a wounded foot: to hurt the pain.”
In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, Judith Butler has pointed out
what may be the masochistic currency present in Levinas‟s thought. Calling attention to
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Derrida‟s claim that attempting to “respond to every Other can only result in a situation of
radical irresponsibility,” she continues by asking,
[I]s it really possible to sidestep self-preservation in the way that Levinas implies?
Spinoza writes in The Ethics that the desire to live the right life requires the desire
to live, to persist in one‟s own being, suggesting that ethics must always marshal
some life drives, even if, as a super-egoic state, ethics threatens to become a pure
culture of the death drive. It is possible, even easy, to read Levinas as an elevated
masochist. (140)
Much like Nietzsche, Butler asks, essentially, does sacrifice and altruism even make sense apart
from a drive towards egoistic pleasure? Continuing this critique of Levinas, Critchley speculates
about the implications of such an ethical project for the subject:
Might one not wonder whether Levinas‟s ethics condemn us to a lifetime of
trauma and lacerating guilt that cannot – and, moreover, should not – be worked
through? Doesn‟t Levinas leave us in a situation of sheer ethical overload where I
must be responsible even for my persecutor, and where the more that I am just the
more I am guilty? If so, then such a position risks amounting to nothing less than
a rather long philosophical suicide note or at the very least an invitation to some
fairly brutal moral masochism. (67-68)
As Critchley aptly identifies, in Levinas, once we have done the “right” thing (justice), we
already owe exponentially more – that is, we are more guilty the more just we are. We can never
do the “right” thing because the “right” thing does not manifest itself in Levinas‟s ethics, and,
therefore, we can never bring ethics to closure.
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If indeed Levinas‟s ethics, as well as West‟s for that matter, do not permit the possibility
of a systematic code of moral action, then how, we might ask, can we ever realize our duty unto
the other and act responsibly? How may we ever do the right thing? According to both Levinas
and West, ethical experience does not give us a guide for moral conduct and action; rather, every
ethical experience is vastly and immensely unique. In this sense, then, it is exactly within the
experience of our inadequacies – even our irresponsibility – which we come to an encounter with
ethics. For Levinas, ethics resides within the very incommensurability of human calculation
with the Infinite; infinity debars the possibility of demystifying ethical experience through
systematic normativity. Similarly, for West, the experience of ethics – the experience of writer‟s
block – refuses the prospect of subjective delimitation upon the other. I cannot universalize the
ethical relationship, the dyadic relation, through resort to a triadic normativity that seeks to
uproot ethical experience by confining it to structures of codified response and action.
Additionally, we may wonder why, if ethics is nothing but sheer, brutal suffering and
encounter, we should even act ethically at all. If ethics is the experience of a pain that is
unbearable, then why would anyone be motivated to act ethically? Furthermore, and perhaps
most importantly, if ethical experience presents suffering as insatiable and incapable of
mitigation, then why act morally in the first place? Morality, after all, must yield some rewards.
Why should we confine ourselves to walking upon an ethical treadmill, so to speak?
I think both West and Levinas are acutely aware of these criticisms (they perhaps even
share these views), which is why both ask, basically, if we are not duped by morality. Does it
even make sense to talk about ethics? During another of her “therapy” sessions with Miss
Lonelyhearts, Betty suggests that it is his job which is affecting his physical health and brusque

89

behavior (ironically, she is right). Leave the job, according to Betty, and Miss Lonelyhearts‟
troubles will leave him. However, as Miss Lonelyhearts claims, the job can never leave him:
“You don‟t understand, Betty, I can‟t quit. And even if I were to quit, it
wouldn‟t make any difference. I wouldn‟t be able to forget the letters, no matter
what I did.”
“Maybe I don‟t understand,” she said, “but I think you‟re making a fool of
yourself.”
“Perhaps I can make you understand. Let‟s start from the beginning. A
man is hired to give advice to the readers of a newspaper. The job is a circulation
stunt and the whole staff considers it a joke. He welcomes the job, for it might
lead to a gossip column, and anyway he‟s tired of being a leg man. He too
considers the job a joke, but after several months at it, the joke begins to escape
him. He sees that the majority of the letters are profoundly humble pleas for
moral and spiritual advice, that they are inarticulate expressions of genuine
suffering. He also discovers that his correspondents take him seriously. For the
first time in his life, he is forced to examine the values by which he lives. This
examination shows him that he is the victim of the joke and not its perpetrator.”
(94, emphasis mine)
Miss Lonelyhearts is not quite the delusional dummy readers often make him out to be. He is
aware of the extent to which his ethical project may just be a meaningless game in which he is
participating. However, ethical value does not come in asking what the significance of ethics
and suffering is; rather, this value comes in the experience of the other in his transcendence.
According to Steven Hendley in From Communicative Action to the Face of the Other: Levinas
90

and Habermas on Language, Obligation, and Community, “[I]t is the other person‟s
unconditional importance to us that gives us a reason to be moral, a reason to suppose we are not
duped by morality when we give the other…consideration not strictly entailed by the intelligent
pursuit of our self-interest.” He continues by stating,
Insofar as we are communicatively bound to one another as interlocutors, we find
ourselves called to an unconditional sense of our importance to each other, a sense
of moral solidarity with each other that is knit into the very fabric of human
intercourse with one another…. The “height” or moral authority of the other
person only “comes to pass” in my relationship to the other, as I attempt to
articulate the sense of unconditional importance of the other to which I find
myself called in my communicative proximity to the other. (166-67)
We might say, simply put, that ethics is in the experience of the other before whom we attempt to
reveal ourselves. We need not, then, speculate what the significance is of either moral action or
of the other in-themselves, respectively – at this point, we are already separated from ethical
experience, we are “duped by morality.” Rather, we locate ethical value within the experience of
moral action itself, when talking about ethics simply doesn‟t make any sense whatsoever. And
this, as I suggest, is what Westian writer‟s block and Levinasian traumatism contribute to the
reevaluation of ethical philosophy in modernity.
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